XForex

The long wait is over! The Bank of International Settlements (BIS) has just released the results from its Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity, conducted in April 2010. The report contains a veritable treasure trove of data, perhaps enough to keep analysts busy until the next report is released in 2013. [Chart below courtesy of WSJ].
First, the data confirmed earlier reports that average daily forex volume had surged to a record level in 2010: “Global foreign exchange market turnover was 20% higher in April 2010 than in April 2007, with average daily turnover of $4.0 trillion compared to $3.3 trillion. The increase was driven by the 48% growth in turnover of spot transactions, which represent 37% of foreign exchange market turnover. The increase in turnover of other foreign exchange instruments [consisting mainly of swaps and accounting for the majority of forex trading activity] was more modest at 7%.” In addition, for the first time, investors and financial institutions accounted for a larger share of turnover than banks, whose trading activity has remained roughly unchanged since 2004.
While emerging currencies as a group accounted for a smaller share of overall activity, certain individual currencies managed to increase their respective shares. The Singapore Dollar, Korean Won, New Turkish Lira, and Brazilian Real all fit into this category. Still other currencies, such as the Indonesian Rupiah and Malaysian Ringgit, also managed impressive gains but account for such a small share of volume as to be insignificant when looking at the overall the picture. Those who were expecting even bigger growth should remember that it’s ultimately a numbers game: the amount of Ringgit it outstanding is dwarfed by the number of Dollars, so any gains that the Ringgit can eke out are impressive. In addition, when you consider that the overall forex pie is also increasing, the nominal increase in volume for these small currencies was actually quite large.
Due to the lack of liquidity and higher spreads, these obscure currencies aren’t really suitable for trading. Of course there will be a handful of institutional and even retail investors that want to make long-term bets on these currencies. They tend to be more aware of the risk and less sensitive to the higher cost and lower convenience. The overwhelming majority of traders, however, churn their portfolios daily, if not hundreds of times per day. A 10pip spread on the USD/MXN (Dollar/Mexican Peso) would be considered too high, let alone a 50 pip spread on any transaction involving the Ukrainian hryvnia.
In short, the majors will account for the majority of trading volume for the foreseeable future, regardless of what happens to the Euro. At the same time, that won’t prevent a handful of selected emerging currencies, such as the Chinese Yuan, Indian Rupee, Brazilian Real, and Russian Ruble from increasing their share. As liquidity rises and spreads decline, volume will increase, and their rising importance will become self-fulfilling.

If you chart the course of the Australian Dollar over the last twelve months alongside the S&P 500, the overlap is jarring. You can see from the chart below that the two lines zig and zag in almost perfect unison. It would seem that there was a slight break in the second quarter of 2010, but even this is an illusion, since the Aussie and the S&P continued to rise and fall in the same patterns over that time period, differing only in degree of fluctuation.
This is probably fair, since the Australian Dollar is a growth currency. According to the just-released Bank of International Settlements (BIS) Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity, the Australian Dollar is now the world’s fifth most traded currency (behind only the G4: Dollar, Euro, Yen, & Pound), having usurped that position from the Swiss Franc. In 2010, it accounted for 7.6% (out of a total of 200%) of all trading volume, primarily as a result of trading in the USD/AUD currency pair, which was the fourth most popular in forex.
Investors have come to see the Australian Dollar in somewhat contradictory terms. It is both stable and liquid, but its economy is unpredictable and inflation is usually above average. The current economic situation was strong, with GDP growth projected to exceed 3% in 2010. Its benchmark interest rate (4.5%) is the highest in the industrialized world, and may touch 5% before the year is over. On the other hand, its political situation is currently uncertain, thanks to an election that produced a hung Parliament and the recent resignation of its Prime Minster. In addition, while its trade balance is currently in surplus, it fell in July thanks to decreased demand from China. Analysts wonder whether it isn’t entirely dependent on China (directly via exports and indirectly via high commodity prices) to generate positive GDP growth.
Sadly, it’s currently not worth parsing the nuances of trade statistics and monetary policy, because it has no bearing on the Aussie, though at least this makes my job easier. For the time being, the Australian Dollar will tick up if it looks like the global economy (principally the US) will avoid a double-dip recession. Otherwise, it is in for the same rough stretch as the S&P.

I have been covering the US Commodity Future Trading Commission’s (CFTC) efforts to revamp the regulatory structure that governs forex, since it was unveiled earlier this year. On August 30, the CFTC formally published the “final regulations concerning off-exchange retail foreign currency transactions. The rules implement provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, which, together, provide the CFTC with broad authority to register and regulate entities wishing to serve as counterparties to, or to intermediate, retail foreign exchange (forex) transactions.”
Not only has the CFTC clearly established its authority to be the primary regulator of retail forex, but it has also laid out specific regulations. Chief among them is limiting leverage to 50:1 for major currency pairs, and 20:1 for “other retail forex transactions.” [It's not presently clear which specific currency pairs will be classified as major].  Remember that the original proposal (which, along with my endorsement, generated vehement protest) called for a decline in leverage to 10:1. Due to negative feedback from traders and brokerages, which ascribed malicious political motives to the changes and argued that it would move the entire industry offshore, the CFTC backed down and implemented only a modest decline in leverage. However, it’s important to note that the National Futures Association (NFA) as well as individual brokers will have discretionary power in setting leverage limits lower than 50:1. There will undoubtedly still be some opposition from traders, but I think we can all agree that the new rule represents a fair compromise.
As for the claim that traders would/will move their accounts offshore, this will become largely moot, since all brokerages, regardless of nationality, will be required to register with the CFTC and subject to its rules/oversight. Of course, those traders that are so inclined will still find a way to circumvent the rules by shifting funds “illegally” to unregistered brokers, but they do so at their own risk and will have no recourse in the event of fraud. As Forbes noted, “It seems these new rules will put a stop to Americans trading retail forex offshore to evade CFTC rules. That trend picked up the pace in recent years and it may need to be reversed quickly.”
Brokerages must register as either futures commission merchants (FCMs) or retail foreign exchange dealers (RFEDs).  These institutions will be required to “maintain net capital of $20 million plus 5 percent of the amount, if any, by which liabilities to retail forex customers exceed $10 million.” While this rule will raise the barriers to entry for potential forex start-up brokerages, it will protect consumers against broker bankruptcy. In addition, “Persons who solicit orders, exercise discretionary trading authority or operate pools with respect to retail forex also will be required to register, either as introducing brokers, commodity trading advisors, commodity pool operators (as appropriate) or as associated persons of such entities.”
One final rule change worth noting is quite interesting: brokerages must “disclose on a quarterly basis the percentage of non-discretionary accounts that realized a profit and to keep and make available records of that calculation.” This calculation will be useful both in and of itself, and also in identifying any significant discrepancies between competing brokers. For the first time, we will be able to see whether forex trading is currently profitable (i.e. whether those that profit are in the majority or minority) and whether/how this profitability metric changes over time, in response to particular market conditions.
The new rules go into effect on October 18.

In the year-to-date, the Swiss Franc has risen 3% against the Dollar, 15% against the Euro, and more than 5% on a trade-weighted basis. It recently touched a record low against the Euro, and is closing in on parity with the USD. Since the beginning of the summer, the Franc has rallied by an unbelievable 15% against the Greenback. I don’t think I’m alone in scratching my head in bewilderment wondering, What could possibly be behind the Franc’s rise?
At the same time, the Dollar and Japanese Yen are also considered safe-haven currencies, and as you can see from the chart below, the three have hardly traded in lockstep. In other words, there must be something distinguishing the Franc. Economists point to a strong economy: “Gross domestic product rose 0.9 percent from the first quarter, when it increased 1 percent. ‘The underlying economics of Switzerland are very, very healthy. Concerns about deflation have subsided.’ ” The consensus is that the Swiss economy will expand by close to 2% on the year. However, this is hardly impressive, especially compared to other industrialized countries. In addition, Swiss interest rates remain low, which means the opportunity cost of holding the Franc is high. There must be something else going on.
According to analysts, the markets have also come to see the Franc as a reincarnation of the Deutschmark, due to its “strong economy, massive foreign reserves, traditional haven status and close links with the German economy.” Those that fear a Eurozone collapse and/or want to make exclusive bets on Germany are now using the Franc as a proxy. I don’t personally understand the logic behind this strategy, but where perception is reality, it’s more important to understand that other investors see the connection rather than seeing the connection for oneself.
Going forward, there is mixed sentiment surrounding the Franc. One analyst warned clients, “I would be cautious about chasing it too far in the short term. There’s still a huge number of headwinds out there.” According to another analyst, “We expect the franc to remain strong throughout the decade.” Personally, I’m inclined to side with the former point of view. From a fundamental standpoint, there isn’t a whole lot to keep the Franc moving up and its recent surge is probably running on fumes. At the very least, I would expect a correction in the near-term.

Raise your hand if you’ve ever heard that expression before? Well, now there’s proof that this well-worn phrase is more than just a pointless platitude: “Royal Bank of Scotland Group indexes that track the performance of four of the most popular currency strategies show that the so-called trend style was the best-performing method, returning 7.3 percent this year through August.”
“Trend-Style” trading is also known as trend-following, and is just as it sounds. Traders identify one-way patterns in specific currency pair(s), and attempt to ride them for as long as possible. Given all of the big movements in currency markets this year, it’s no wonder that trend-following is the most popular. If you look at the 52 week trading ranges for the six most popular USD currency pairs, you can see that highs and lows are often as far as 20% apart. The EUR/USD pair, for example, fell 20% over a mere 7 months. Anyone who sold in December 2009 and bought to cover in June 2010 would have earned an annualized return of 35% without leverage! Even if you had captured only a couple months of depreciation would have yielded impressive returns. In addition, you could have traded the Euro back up from June until August and reaped a 60% annualized return. Best of all, both of these trends (down, then up) unfolded very smoothly, with only minor corrections along the way.
The other three strategies surveyed by the Royal Scotland Group (“RSG”) were the Carry Trade, Value Trade, and Volatility Trade. Unfortunately, data was only offered for the carry trade strategy (confusingly referred to by RSG as the volatility strategy), which is down 5.9% in the year-to-date. The carry trade strategy involves selling a currency with a low yield and favor of one with a high yield, and profiting from the interest rate spread. In order for this strategy to be profitable, however, the long currency must either appreciate or remain constant. Thus, when volatility is high – as it has been over the last 2-3 years – this is a losing strategy.
We can only guess that a true volatility strategy probably would have been the second most profitable strategy. This strategy can be implemented through the use of long and short spot positions, as well as through trading in options and other derivatives. As I said, there is no shortage of volatility at the moment: “Since the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, the dollar has seen record volatility against the euro…including six moves of at least 10%.” For traders that profit from volatility, the current uncertainty has created a windfall situation.
However, it has made value trading – based on fundamentals and the notion of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) – risky and unpopular: “The volatility also has made what would appear to be a straightforward bet against the dollar fraught with risk. Three factors tend to move currencies: the pace of growth, debt levels and interest rates. By those standards, the dollar should be falling against the currencies of emerging-market and commodity-producing nations.” Not only is this not the case (a decline in risk appetite has turned the Dollar into a safe-haven), but even betting on a protracted Dollar decline is itself risky because of surging volatility. One way around this is to trade a Dollar Index (by way of an ETF, for example) which is inherently less volatile (half as volatile, to be exact) than individual currency pairs.
That’s not to say that value trading isn’t profitable over the long-term. “Empirical evidence suggests that currencies…show a tendency to revert back toward PPP in the longer run.” Given current volatility/uncertainty, however, this strategy is unlikely to be profitable in the short run. Fortunately, uncertainty doesn’t negate opportunity, and traders should plot strategy accordingly

Over the last few weeks, Japan had been inching slowly towards intervention. [In fact, I was prepared to write a post yesterday about intervention being imminent, but that is neither here nor there...] The Finance Minister, Governors of the Central Bank, Members of Parliament, and even the Prime Minister himself had started to become increasingly vocal about the Yen’s un-halting rise, and the need to control it. It had already touched a 15-year high, and was only 4% away from it’s all-time low. With rhetorical intervention and its easy monetary policy failing to sway investors, the Bank of Japan sold an estimated $20 Billion worth of Yen on the open market.
By no coincidence, the intervention was carried out only one day after a Parliamentary vote to see whether Naoto Kan would be replaced as Prime Minister. Having defeated Ichiro Ozawa and survived the challenge, Kan evidently was determined to make good on his promise to rescue the economy from the brink of another downturn. (Only a few days earlier, he admitted, “We’re conducting various talks, so other countries won’t say negative things when Japan acts. We’re studying now various scenarios, examining possible responses from markets when we take a decisive measure.”)
Reaction to the intervention has been mixed. On the one hand, the fact that the BOJ waited so long before stepping in is evidence that this measure was taken out of desperation. According to Billionaire investor George Soros, “Japan was right to act to bring down the value of the yen. ‘Certainly, they are hurting because the currency is too strong so I think they are right to intervene.’ ” Politicians and policymakers, on the other hand, were not so kind. One US Senator called the move “disturbing” and Jeane-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB, said it was “not…appropriate.”
From these snippets, then, it’s clear that the intervention is being conducted unilaterally and lacks any support from other Central Banks. Thus, if the BOJ is to continue selling the Yen, it will do so alone and perhaps even under the open contempt of other Central Banks. At the same time, it appears to have some credibility with investors, who may back off the Yen for the time being. That’s because the BOJ is trying to make owning the Yen as unattractive as possible, by driving down interest rates and attempting to spur inflation. Whether investors will take the hint and stop and return to using the Yen as a funding currency for the carry trade is still unclear. (Despite unraveling significantly over the last two years, the Yen carry trade may still exceed $500 Billion). Japan also has to contend with China, which has been putting upward pressure on the Yen by buying Japanese bonds.
For that matter, it’s not even clear whether the BOJ will continue to intervene. Perhaps it just wanted to send a message to investors by showing that it can weaken the Yen any time it wants. Besides, a protracted campaign to hold down the Yen would be expensive and doomed to failure over the long-term, as the BOJ learned the hard way in 2003-2004 and has probably been reminded of by the Swiss National Bank’s recent failure to weaken the Franc. On the other hand, the BOJ needs to show investors that it is serious, and a “shock and awe” intervention campaign is probably the only real way to achieve this.
Either way, I think it’s fair to say that those who bet on the Yen do so at their own peril. While I don’t think the Yen is suddenly going to return to 100 JPY/USD, the fact that my personal reserves are not nearly as vast as those of the Bank of Japan means I’m not inclined to bet on it…

So why is the Forint in the doghouse? Ironically, the answer is connected to mortgages. During the inflation of the housing bubble, Hungarians preferred to borrow in Swiss Francs, because interest rates were significantly lower than domestic Hungarian rates. This was not a mere trend; it was a full-blown phenomenon: “About 5.4 trillion forint($24.1 billion), or two-thirds of Hungary’s overall household credit, is denominated in foreign currencies. Of that, 82 percent is in Swiss francs, according to central bank data.” When the housing and credit markets were stable, noone bothered to examine currency risk. Given how much the Forint has fallen against the Franc, you can bet they are now.
As if the decline in housing prices wasn’t bad enough, consider that Hungarians that borrowed in Swiss Francs have now seen their mortgage payments/balances increase by more than 50%, depending on when they took out their loans. It goes without saying that even under the best of circumstances, it would be difficult to find the wherewithal – let alone the motivation – to repay such a loan. When you throw an economic recession into the mix, the prospects for repayment become even more bleak. As the Hungarian Forint has depreciated, loan defaults have risen, further stoking the Forint’s depreciation and loan defaults.
Alas, the Hungarian government’s program for solving this crisis is to punish the banks, both by allowing borrowers to delay repayment and by levying a massive tax – the highest on the EU – on all banks. While this might be helpful for bringing down the country’s budget deficit to the 3% mandated by the EU, it probably won’t do much for the economy. Speaking of the budget deficit, it has prompted S&P to warn of a possible cut in Hungary’s sovereign credit rating to junk-status.
Hungary’s cause hasn’t been helped by the breakdown of talks with the EU and IMF that would have supplied it with emergency funding. As if it wasn’t obvious from the Forint’s decline, investors are beginning to fear the worst and are slowly turning away from Hungary. The country’s benchmark stock market index has fallen 4% over the last six months. Meanwhile, foreign lenders are starting to balk at buying Hungarian debt without some kind of EU/IMF backstop, much like the one that was afforded to Greece: “Auction saleshave been a barometer of investor confidence in the country. On Sept. 2, Hungary sold 35 billion forint of 12-month Treasury bills, 15 billion forint less than planned, after receiving bids for 63.4 billion forint of the bills. Five days later, it sold 60 billion forint of three-month Treasury bills, 10 billion forint more than planned.”
At this point, all eyes are on the Hungarian government to simultaneously boost the economy and repair its budget deficit: “The rating agenciesare taking the same line as the markets and giving the government until local elections in October the benefit of the doubt, but if they don’t see then either a recommitment to the IMF program, or real concrete measures I think they move to cut the rating to junk.” If that were to happen, the self-fulfilling downward spiral in the Forint would probably continue unabated.
It makes you wonder: if the Greek Drachma were still around, how closely would it resemble the Forint?

On the monetary policy front, Central Banks have begun to divide into two camps. One camp, consisting of the Federal Reserve Bank, European Central Bank, Bank of England, Bank of Japan, and Swiss National Bank (whose currencies, it should be noted, account for the majority of foreign exchange activity), remains frozen in place. Interest rates in all five countries/regions remain at rock bottom, near 0% in most cases. While the ECB’s benchmark interest rate is seemingly set higher than the others, its actual overnight rate is also close to 0%. Meanwhile, none of these Banks has given any indication that it will hike rates before the end of 2011.
In the other camp are the Banks of Canada, Australia, Brazil, and a handful of other emerging market Central Banks, all of which have cautiously moved to hike rates on the basis of economic recovery. Among industrialized countries, Australia (4.5%) is now at the head of the pack, with New Zealand (3%) in a distant second. Brazil’s benchmark Selic rate, at 10.75%, makes it the world leader among (widely-followed) emerging market countries. It is followed by Russia (7.75%), Turkey (7%), and India (6.1%), among others. The lone exception appears to be China, which maintains artificially low rates to influence the Yuan. [More on that below.]
Central Banks have been especially busy in the currency markets. The Swiss National Bank (SNB) was the first to intervene, and as a result of spending €200 Billion, it managed to hold the Franc below €1.50. As a result of the EU sovereign debt crisis, however, the Franc broke through the peg and his since risen to a record high against the Euro. Unsurprisingly, the SNB has abandoned its forex intervention program. Throughout the past year, the Central Banks of Canada, Brazil, Thailand, Korea have threatened to intervene, but only Brazil has taken action so far, in the form of a levy on all foreign capital inflows. Last week, the Bank of Japan broke its 6-year period of inaction by intervening on behalf of the Yen, which instantly rose 3% on the move. The BOJ has pledge to remain involved, but the extent and duration is not clear.
Finally, the Bank of China allowed the Yuan to appreciate for the first time in two years, but its pace has been carefully controlled, to say the least. In the last few weeks, the Yuan has actually picked up speed, but critics insist that it remains undervalued. In addition, China has contradicted the Yuan’s rise against the Dollar through its purchases of Japanese bonds, which has spurred a rise in the Yen. This is both ironic and counter-productive to global economic recovery: “Since China is growing at 10%, it can afford to undermine exports and boost domestic demand by letting the yuan appreciate more rapidly against the dollar. But China doesn’t want to do that. In fact, although China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange deregulated the currency market overnight, the measures, which allow some exporters to retain their foreign currency holdings for a year, should boost private demand for dollars, not yuan.”
The efforts listed above have undoubtedly moderated the impacts of the financial crisis and consequent economic downturn. However, the banks have found it impossible to engineer a convincing recovery, and at this point, there probably isn’t much more that they do can do. As a result, many analysts are now pinning their hopes on fiscal policy (despite its equally dubious track record). Perhaps, the title of this post should have been: Keep an Eye on Governments and their Stimulus Plans.

Today, we bring you an interview with Marc Chandler, the global head of currency strategy for Brown Brothers Harriman. Previously he was the chief currency strategist for HSBC Bank USA and Mellon Bank. Marc is a prolific writer and speaker whose essays have been published in the Financial Times, Barron’s, Euromoney, Corporate Finance, and Foreign Affairs. He is also the contributing economic editor for Active Trader Magazine and to TheStreet.Com. Below, he shares his thoughts on fundamental analysis versus technical analysis, the false Euro rally, Japanese Yen intervention, and other subjects.
Forex Blog: I would would like to begin by asking you to briefly explain your approach to analyzing the forex markets. Do you prefer technical or fundamental analysis, or a combination of both?

I’ve been analyzing currencies for a while, more than 20 years. I tend to think of myself as a fundamentalist, that is I look at macroeconomics, I look at policy, but at the same time, I’m a strategist, so I’m not just forecast GDP or trade. Ultimately, my goal is try to see where the currencies are going themselves, like the Euro or the Yen, or the Canadian Dollar. I find that technical analysis helps me quantify the risk at what level do I admit I’m wrong. And that’s very important. I think that often times, one would think that with economists, it’s always about being right. And I think that with trading and strategy, risk management is the most important thing. I find that technical analysis tells me where I should put my stop in effect – where I should admit that I’m wrong, unlike fundamentalists that say any level of US GDP or trade balance, the Dollar could be all over the place. Tehcnicals help me identify, help me fine-tune that a bit. I think that trading is so difficult that I need to use all of the possible tools that I have had at my disposal. It’s not just fundamental knowledge, but also studying psychology and price action.

Forex Blog: As head of currency research for Brown Brothers Harriman, it looks like you cover most of the major currencies, as well as a handful of emerging/exotic currencies. What do you think about the macroeconomic gulf that is forming between the “G4″ economies (US, UK, Eurozone, Japan) and the emerging market economies (along the lines of debt, GDP growth, etc.)? Do you think that this division is reflected in forex markets?

Most of my career, I’ve focused on the major currencies, but to tell you the truth, it’s kind of blurry what’s an emerging market, especially with all that’s come to light during this crisis. Mexico, for example, Israel and South Korea are OECD countries and yet MSCI and some of these other investment agencies might consider them emerging market, so the line is really blurry.

For example, recently, the Bank of Japan intervened and they bought a lot of US Dollars. But it’s not clear to me – because the Chinese currency is so closely tied to the US Dollar – it’s not clear to me that maybe Japan wasn’t just as concerned, or even more concerned with the Yen against the RMB – since China is its biggest trading partners – as with the Yen against the Dollar. But they had to intervene on Dollar/Yen because of the way the foreign exchange market works and because China’s currency is not convertible.

While I tend to focus on the major countries, I don’t really know how to do the job and think about the world and global capital markets without recognizing and integrating what’s going on in many of the major emerging markets.

Forex Blog:  Do you develop your own macroeconomic forecasts or do you simply plug in the data that your economist colleagues have developed?

 Brown Brothers doesn’t really have a global economist- they’re not that kind of bank. So when it comes to GDP, for example, I will not have a formal forecast for it. I will have a guess of it and I’ll shy one way or the other from the broad market consensus. So for example, the broad market consensus for Q3 US GDP is about 1.9%. I would think of myself as a little bit above there. The important thing for the markets is instead of forecasting GDP as the end result, my end result is the Dollar or the Euro. And I would be looking at GDP, at relative economic strength as one of the inputs in an informal exchange rate model.

I would say that the emerging markets typically grow faster than the industrialized, mature economies. I find that faster emerging market growth – to me that’s more like a “dog bites man” story.  This crisis, unlike past crises, from 1995-2002, these were emerging market crises: East Asia, Latin America…this is among the first crises that originated in industrialized countries.

Many of the emerging market economies have strong domestic demand, so they were able to compensate for the weakness in foreign demand. But they’ve also benefited from the terms of trade: higher commodity prices than manufactured goods prices. I think in general, that many people look at the debt levels of advanced, industrialized countries and worry that the US is becoming Greece or Argentina. I think that kind of thinking is misguided. It confuses things. It confuses cyclical comparisons with structural developments. I think there’s no doubt that the US is not Argentina. The Dollar is a major reserve currency. Most trade is invoiced in US Dollars – even when Australia sells iron ore to China, it’s probably invoiced in US Dollars and paid in US Dollars – not Argentinian Pesos or Mexican Pesos or whatever the current threat to the US Dollar is.

Forex Blog: Based on this, then, you don’t see any inherent contradiction between the Dollar’s strength and the gap in growth fundamentals between the US and emerging markets?

Since the opening up of China, for example, in the late ‘70s, China has definitely grown faster than the US. I’d say that’s also true form many Latin American countries like Brazil. Of course they grow much faster than the US, Europe, and Japan. But sometimes what determines currencies are not relative growth differentials. If you think about what’s happened since Lehman’s collapse, the Japanese Yen has been the strongest currency, and I don’t think that’s because of strong  Japanese economic fundamentals. I think it has to do more with the unwinding of carry trades – Japan being a current account surplus country – that seems to be more telling than saying they have a booming economy, which of course they don’t. There’s no free lunches; the reason Brazil, Turkey, and South Africa offer higher interest rates is to compensate investors for some of the risk (political risk, inflation risk, maybe even historic risk – that you couldn’t depend on these counties in the past, and the market has to anticipate issues going forward). For example, Brazil (Real) is one of peoples’ favorite currencies, and the budget deficit is at an 8 month high, and they are approaching a current account deficit. So when I hear about fundamentals, it kind of begs the question, ‘Well, which fundamentals should be reflected, and what happens if the fundamentals are pointing in contradictory directions?’

Forex Blog: Is there a particular (emerging) currency that you think is not getting enough attention?

I’m looking for an opportunity to buy the Brazilian Real, although I think it could weaken first. I also like India – I think they’re the tortoise compared to the rabbit of China. I like Malaysia. I like Columbia. I like China. We generally think that in the emerging market space, Asian currencies over time, will appreciate against the US Dollar. They have favorable dynamics, pulled into the Chinese economic orbit, still tied to the US tech cycle, strong underlying economic fundamentals, and pressure to raise interest rates.

Forex Blog: On your financial blog, Marc to Market, a recent post was entitled, “The Yen Conundrum.” Can you elaborate on the contradiction between weak Japanese fundamentals and the strong Yen? Do you expect the trends in capital flows that are arguably behind the Yen’s appreciation will reverse anytime soon?

To me, the Yen’s strength is kind of like a thermometer – a temperature check for a sick patient. I suspect that the Yen’s strength is a function of the deleveraging taking place in the world. When the deleveraging stops, I will be more confident that the Yen has peaked. I’m not sure that is the case yet. I think intervention kind of caught some people by surprise. They spent a lot of money to get the kind of advance they got. They got 3-Yen advance – about a 5% move. The big picture is that it might lose some strength, but gradually.

Forex Blog: Speaking of the Yen, the Bank of Japan recently “intervened” on its behalf. Do you expect that this is only the beginning of a long program of intervention? Given the poor track record of the Swiss National Bank (in terms of the Franc), do you think that other Central Banks may follow suit?

This was a unilateral intervention. There are people who say that this opens up a Pandora’s Box for other countries to intervene, but I don’t think so. I think that those Central Banks that were inclined to intervene have already been intervening, like some Asian Central Banks and like Brazil. They continue to intervene. I think that it’s unusual for a G7 country to intervene. I don’t think that any other G7 country will intervene, though earlier this year and last year, though Switzerland did intervene quite actively and aggressively as part of their quantitative easing. With Japan, it does depend on the Yen/Dollar. However, the Japanese Yen intervention was quite large, and usually the first intervention is the biggest intervention. It’s been a week now, and they haven’t been in. Since that Thursday, the low that we’ve been at was 85.25 and we’re just above there right now. But it does not appear that they are sterilizing intervention, though it’s hard to tell because of the volatility caused by it being the end of the fiscal half year. Generally speaking, I think that the Japanese are not committing yet- they bought just short of 20 Trillion Yen – about $2 Billion – and I don’t think that’s enough yet to have really changed the general tide in Dollar/Yen. I think the deleveraging process has more ways to work and it’s bigger than 20 Billion Dollars.

Forex Blog: When the Euro rallied in the beginning of the summer, a number of forex commentators (myself included) declared a paradigm shift, whereby investors would stop worrying about risk and instead focus on the fundamentals. Ultimately, this shift never materialized, and the Euro appears to have resumed its decline. What is your assessment of the Euro’s recent performance, and what can we expect for the immediate future?

I think that the Euro’s bounce over the summer was a function of people taking a step back from the abyss. In the spring, it maybe looked like the Eurozone would collapse and members would drop out. When people realized that the Euro would survive and institutions would be reformed, the Euro bounced back a bit.

I think that we’re kind of caught now between problems in Europe – I think that risk assessment is fundamental. I do think that most recently, the widening of the spreads in Europe has not read to new Euro weakness, that being said, it might be preventing a serious Euro rally. We’re still about 2 cents below where we were in August. On the other hand, the Dollar has stood on 2 legs. One is bad things in Rest of World (ROW) and the other is good things here. But those good things have faded, and quite quickly in Q2. And so my equilibrium level for the Euro if there is such a thing is probably a bit higher than at the beginning of the year, about 1.33 – 1.35 to the Dollar.

You also have to look at restructuring of Euro debt, and ask, ‘How did Greece live beyond its means.’ The answer is that they were buying lots of goods and German Banks were happily lending them the money to do so. In fact, 70% of Greek debt is owned by non-residents. Going forward, the problems can only be overcome by stronger growth, which doesn’t seem likely at the moment. Still, assuming that interest rate differentials (between Germany and the rest of the EU) narrow, we will see the Euro strengthen.

Forex Blog: I recall a Bloomberg News video segmentin which you highlighted the 200-day moving average as an important forex indicator, especially for investors with a long-term outlook. Could you explain this for the benefit of my readers? Are there any other basic technical analysis indicators that you think fundamental analysts should pay attention to?

First I just want to say that we must appreciate time frame. For example, most fund managers have a medium time frame, and it doesn’t make sense for them to look at daily bar charts. That’s really just false symbolism, noise.

I like the 200 day Moving Average because it gives you a sense of trend. I think I remember the Bloomberg story that you’re referring to. I was looking at 250 day Moving Averages, and the idea of what some people call Golden Crosses. The idea is that the 50-day Moving Average has gone below the 250 Day Moving Average, in the Swiss Franc and the Pound. If you look at the Euro/Dollar exchange rate, the last time this happened was when the Euro was launched in 1999, and it led to a large sell-off. As I aid though, you have to ultimately look at time frame.

Forex Blog: I haven’t read your book, but I’m intrigued by the title: “Making Sense of the Dollar: Exposing Dangerous Myths about Trade and Foreign Exchange.” Are there any particular foreign exchange myths that are especially pertinent and that you’d like to share?

The thesis of my book is that US Dollar expansion strategy is more robust than friends and enemies insist. For example, I look at the current account deficit. People say it makes us poorer but I show that’s not really the case. People think that companies service foreign demand through exporting, but they should be looking at sales from US affiliates, which have been 4 times as much as exports. In other words, build locally sell locally.

Forex Blog: What is your advice for (forex) investors that want to beat the market during these uncertain times?

Well I think that forex investor is an oxymoron, but anyway, there is a misconception that traders win by being right more than they are wrong. I think you win through discipline. That means honoring your stops and limiting your losses. Entry and exit levels are less important than discipline.

I started looking at currencies around the time the Plaza Accord was signed, and since then, I can’t remember ever seeing certainty in the currency markets. You can make a case for bonds and stocks being connected with the business cycle, but the forex connection is more elastic, more variable. I think that this is an advantage for currency traders because it means they are accustomed to uncertainty.

The last time I travelled to Thailand, in 2004, the Baht was trading around 40 USD/THB, compared to the current exchange rate of 30.7. That’s pretty incredible when you consider that during the intervening time, Thailand experienced a military coup and related political instability, as well as a financial crisis that dealt an especially heavy blow to the world’s emerging market currencies. And yet, if you chart the Baht’s performance against the Dollar, you would have only the faintest ideas that either of these crises took place.
To be sure, the financial crisis exacted a heavy toll on Thai financial markets and the Thai economy. Stock and bond prices lurched downward, as foreign investors moved cash into so-called safe haven currencies, such as the US Dollar and Japanese Yen. However, the Thai economy was among the first to emerge from recession, expanding in 2009, and surging in 2010. “Compared with a year earlier, GDP rose 9.1%, while the economy grew 10.6% in the first half,” according to the most recent data.  Tourism, one of the country’s pillar industries, has already recovered, along with exports and consumption. Projected export growth of 27% is expected to drive the economy forward at 7-7.5% in 2010, according to both the IMF and Thai government projections. The consensus is that growth would have been even more spectacular (perhaps 1-2% higher) if not for the politcal protests, which were finally quelled in May of this year.
Despite concerns about risk and volatility, foreign investors are once again pouring funds in Thailand at a record pace. Over $1.4 Billion has been pumped into the stock market alone in the year-to-date. As a result, “Thailand’s benchmark SET Index has rebounded30 percent since May…helping send the SET to its highest level since November 1996.” Capital inflows are also being spurred by Thai interest rates, which are rising (the benchmark is currently at 1.75%), even while rates in the industrialized world remain flat.  At this point, the cash coming into Thailand well exceeds the cash going out, which remains low due to steady imports and restrictions on capital outflows by Thai individuals and institutions. This imbalance is reflected in the Central Bank of Thailand’s forex reserves, which recently topped $150 Billion, more than 50% of GDP.
Anticipation is building that Thailand will use some its reserves to try to halt, or even reverse the appreciation of the Baht. After last week’s intervention by the Bank of Japan, such intervention is now seen not only as being more acceptable, but also more necessary. Due to pressure from the Prime Minister, the Central Bank has convened at least one emergency meeting to determine the best course of action. So far, members can only agree that restrictions on capital flows and lending standards to exporters should be relaxed.
For what it’s worth, Thailand’s richest man has urged the Central Bank not to act: “The effort is likely fruitless as foreign capital is expected to incessantly flood into Thailand because of the country’s healthy economic recovery and export growth. The baht as a matter of fact should become even stronger should Thailand’s politics remain in normal condition.” He is supported by the facts, which show that the Thai export sector has held up just fine in the face of the rising Baht, though perhaps only because other Asian currencies have risen at a comparable pace.
If other Central Banks were to step up their intervention – (Deutsche Bank has argued, via the chart below, that all “Asian central banks have for many years been more or less persistently in the market “stabilizing” their currencies, but with a clear bias towards preventing USD depreciation in this region”) – the Bank of Thailand would probably have no choice but to follow suit.
Otherwise, it might not be long before the Baht clears 30 USD/THB. My next post on the Baht, in 2015, will probably be in the form of a similar lamentation…

The Chinese Yuan has touched a new high, at 6.69 USD/CNY. Given that the Yuan has still only risen about 2% since the peg was officially loosened in June -  with most of that appreciation taking place in the last couple weeks – there still remains intense pressure on China to do more.
Last week’s intervention by the Bank of Japan diverted a tremendous amount of attention towards the Yuan. In fact, many analysts have argued that it is only because of the Yuan-Dollar peg (itself, as well as the Chinese purchases of Yen assets that it engendered) that Japan was forced to act: ” ‘Countries see that getting involved in currency manipulation is a way to give themselves an advantage’…’China, their actions affected Japan, and Japan is affecting us.’ ” The Yen intervention could also force the G20 to re-focus its attention on the Yuan, and at least devote some discussion to it at the next summit.

It should be noted that the two soundbites above both emanated from US Congressmen, which is important because the US government is currently mulling action on the Yuan currency peg. Politicians are growing tired by the Treasury Department’s repeated failure to call China a “Currency Manipulator,” which would require diplomatic talks and even trade sanctions. The Treasury will have an opportunity redeem itself in its next report on foreign exchange, due out on October 15, but it is expected that the report will either be delayed or released without adequately addressing the undervalued Yuan.
In fact, Treasury Secretary Geithner testified before Congress last week, and at least admitted that something needed to be done: “The pace of appreciation has been too slow and the extent of appreciation too limited. We have to figure out ways to change behavior.” However, this was only in response to acerbic criticism – (Senator Schumer told him, “I’m increasingly coming to the view that the only person in this room who believes China is not manipulating its currency is you.”) – and he ultimately failed to outline a timetable/blueprint for action. Despite the consensus among politicians (and President Obama) that the currency peg is harmful to the US economy, Geithner made it clear that the Treasury Department continues to favor unilateral action towards dealing with problem, without Congressional intervention. For now, then, politicians are probably relegated to saber-rattling and name-calling.
China’s response to this charade has been predictable. Trade representatives hinted that China wouldn’t bow to external pressure, and that any attempt at “punishment” would be met with countervailing actions. China also questioned the economics between arguments that the Dollar peg contributes to trade imbalance, calling such claims “groundless.” This position is actually supported by the notion that while the Yuan appreciated by 20% against the Dollar from 2005-2008, the US/China trade deficit actually widened.
In practice, China is likely to stick to its policy of gradual Yuan appreciation, or a few reasons. First of all, while Chinese policymakers know that they don’t need to wholly appease US politicians, they at least need to pretend that they are listening. It’s true that the US is dependent on Chinese products and its purchases of Treasury Bonds. However, it is arguably just as dependent on the US to buy its exports, which promotes employment and social stability, and it is keen to avoid a trade war if possible.
Second, a long-term appreciation of the RMB is actually in China’s best interest. If it wants to spur domestic consumption and promote more value-added manufacturing, it will need a more valuable currency. Outbound M&A, especially involving natural resource companies, will also be more economical if the Yuan is worth more. Also, if China has any serious ambitions of turning the Yuan into a global reserve currency, it will need to create capital markets that are deeper and more liquid, which it is currently unmotivated to do, lest it spur demand for Yuan by foreign institutional investors.
Finally, China should let the Yuan appreciate because it is financially gainful to do so. As I mentioned above, its trade surplus with the US has widened over the last few years as prices for its exports grow along with quantity. Meanwhile, prices for imports and prices paid for commodities and other natural resources have declined in Yuan-terms. For that reason, I think China will probably continue to stick its current policy, and allow the RMB to continue to slowly inch up.

Wouldn’t life just be a little easier if the EUR/USD, the most important forex pair and bellwether of currency markets, could simply pick a direction and stick to it. It dove during the financial crisis, only to surge during the apparent recovery phase, fell during the sovereign debt crisis, and rose during the paradigm shift, then fell as risk appetite waned, only to rise again in September, en route to a 5-month high.
There are certainly those that argue that the Euro’s recent surge reflects renewed confidence in the Eurozone economy and prospects for resolving the EU debt crisis. After all, most Euro members will reduce their budget deficits in 2010 and auctions of new bonds are once again oversubscribed. On the other hand, interest rates for the PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain) have risen to multi-year highs, as investors are finally trying to make a serious effort at pricing the possibility of default.
As every analyst has pointed out, none of the EU’s fiscal problems have been solved. EU members have certainly proven adept at resolving acute crises and the ECB certainly deserves credit for keeping credit markets functioning, but none has proposed a viable solution for repairing of member countries’ fiscal and economic health. Currency devaluation is impossible. Sovereign default is being prevented. That leaves wage cuts and increased productivity as the only two paths to equilibrium. The former could be accomplished through inflation, but the ECB seems reluctant to allow this to happen.
For better or worse, the EU seems to have pushed these problems down the road, and if all goes according to plan, they won’t need to be revisited for 2-3 years. For now, then, the Euro is probably safe, and may even thrive. Short positions in the Euro are being unwound with furious speed and data indicate that there is still plenty of scope for further unwinding. Inflation remains subdued, economic growth is stable, and the ECB so far hasn’t voiced any disapproval of the Euro’s rise. While I promote this bullishness with the caveat that “traders have shown a willingness to smack the euro lower from time to time on the slightest news or rumor of downgrades to euro-zone sovereign or bank ratings,” the general Euro trend is now unquestionably UP.

Brazil is beating the drumbeat of war. The forex variety, that is. According to the Finance Minister, “We’re in the midst of an international currency war, a general weakening of currency. This threatens us because it takes away our competitiveness.” By its own admission, Brazil will not be sitting on the sidelines of this war. Rather, it will do battle on behalf of its currency, the Real.
It’s not hard to understand why the Real is soaring. Its benchmark Selic rate is 10.75%, with government bonds yielding an even higher 12%. Even after controlling inflation, this is the highest among major currencies. Its economy is booming; GDP is projected at 10% in 2010. As a result, capital flow inflows have returned to pre-credit crisis levels: “Net foreign-exchange inflows totaled $11.14 billion in the September 1-17 period, up from $2.11 billion in the first 10 days of the month, according to data released Tuesday by the country’s central bank.” The inflows have been driven by a $70 Billion stock offering by PetroBras, the (formerly) state-owned oil company. It is a record sum, and over 3 times bigger than the eye-popping $23 Billion the Agricultural Bank of China raised only a few months ago. “If the Petrobras deal had never happened, the real might currently be trading somewhere around 1.75 per dollar,” compared to 1.70 today. With other companies rushing to follow suit with debt and equity offerings, cash will probably continue to pour in.
As I said at the beginning of this post, the Bank of Brazil has several tools up its sleeve. It has already resumed “surprise daily auctions to buy excess dollars in the spot market” (suspended in 2006), in which investors can trade Dollars for Brazilian government debt. It is also proposing reverse currency swaps, which would serve a similar purpose. ” ‘The order is to buy, buy and buy,’ ” said a government source. It has purchased nearly $1 Billion in foreign currency in the month of September alone, and has pledged to deploy its $10 Billion Sovereign investment fund if necessary. Finally, there is talk of raising the tax rate (currently 2%) on all foreign capital inflows, though there is no real timetable for such a move.
Alas, while the government of Brazil is certainly sincere in its intentions to hold down the Real, it lacks the wherewithal. Its $1 Billion intervention in September was dwarfed by the $20+ Billion spent by the Bank of Japan in one day to hold down the Yen. Even controlling for the difference in the size of their respective economies, Brazil has still been thoroughly outspent. Its $10 Billion investment fund pales in comparison to the ~$1 Trillion forex reserves of Japan. In short, Brazil would be wise to avoid full-fledged engagement in currency war.

On September 27, Brazilian Finance Minister, Guido Montega, used the term “currency war” to describe the series of recent Central Bank interventions in forex markets. While he may not have intended it, the term stuck, and financial journalists everywhere have run wild with it.
In the current cycle (dating back a couple years), more than a dozen Central Banks have entered the forex markets with the intention of holding down their respective currencies, both against each other and also against the US Dollar. What makes it a war is that the Central Banks are fighting to outspend and outdo each other. It is a War of Attrition, in that Central Banks will fight until they’ve exhausted all of their wherewithal, conceding defeat for their currencies. On the other hand, unlike in a conventional war, there aren’t any alliances, nor is there much in the way of little strategy. Central Banks simply buy large blocks of counter currencies and hope their own currencies will then depreciate on the spot market. In addition, since the counter currencies are almost always Dollars and/or Euros, the participants in this war are not even competing directly against each other, but rather against an enemy that isn’t doing much to fight back. [Chart belowcourtesy of Der Spiegel].
The Swiss National Bank (SNB) was the first to intervene, and staged a one-year campaign over the course of 2009 to hold the Swiss Franc at 1.50 against the Euro. Ultimately, it failed when the sovereign debt crisis caused an exodus of Euro selling. The Bank of Brazil was next, although its interventions havebeen more modest; it seems to have accepted the ultimate futility of its efforts, and will seek to slow the Real’s appreciation rather than halt it. Last month, the Bank of Japan spent $20 Billion in one session in order to show the markets how serious it is about fighting the Yen’s rise. In fact, it was this intervention that sparked Montega’s comments about currency war. (The BOJ hasn’t intervened since). All along, the People’s Bank of China has continued to add to its war chest of reserves – currently $2.5 Trillion – as part of the ongoing Yuan-Dollar peg. And of course, there have been a handful of smaller interventions (South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan) and no shortage of rhetorical (Canada, South Africa) interventions, as well as indirect (US, UK) intervention.
That’s right- don’t forget that the Fed and the Bank of England, through their respective quantitative easing programs, have injected Trillions into the financial markets and caused their currencies to weaken. In a sense, all of the subsequent interventions have been effected in order to restore the equilibrium in the currency markets that was lost when these two Central Banks deflated there currencies through wholesale money printing. Since much of this cash has found its way into emerging markets (See chart below), you can’t blame their Central Banks from trying to soften some of the upward pressure on their currencies.
It’s still too early too early to say how far the currency war will go. The G7/G20 has announced that it will address the issue at its next summit, though it probably won’t lead to much in the way of action. Ultimately, politicians can’t do much more than shake their fingers at countries that try to hold down their currencies. In the case of the Yuan-Dollar peg, American politicians have tried to take this one step further by threatening to slap China with punitive trade sanctions, but this probably won’t come to pass and may disappear as an issue altogether after the November elections. As I reported on Friday, Brazil has taken matters into its own hands by taxing all foreign capital inflows, but this hasn’t had much effect on the Real.
That brings me to my final point, which is that all currency intervention is futile in the long term, because most Central Banks have limited capacity to intervene. If they print too much money to hold down their currencies, they risk stoking inflation. Of course China is the exception to this rule, but this is less because of the size of its war chest and more because of the mechanics of its exchange rate regime. For Central Banks to successfully manipulate their currencies on the spot market, they must fight against the Trillions of Dollars in daily forex turnover. Eventually, every Central Bank must reckon with this truism.
In terms of identifying the winners and losers of the currency war (as I promised to do in the title of this post, the Euro will probably lose (read: appreciate) because the ECB is not willing to participate. The same goes for the Swiss Franc, since the SNB has basically forsaken currency intervention for the time being. The Bank of Japan has deep pockets, and if the markets push the Yen back up above 85 Yen/Dollar, I wouldn’t be surprised to see it intervene again. With the Fed mulling an expansion of its quantitative easing program, meanwhile, the Dollar will probably continue to sink. And as for the countries that are doing the actual intervening, they might succeed in temporarily holding down the valuer of their respective currencies.  As capital shifts to emerging markets over the long-term, however, their currencies will soon resume rising.

The Bank of Korea is one of the major participants in the ongoing global currency war, intervening on behalf of the Won to the tune of $1 Billion per day! Meanwhile, the Korean Won has risen 5% in the last month, and 10% over the last three months, the highest in Asia. What a disconnect!
First of all, what’s behind the Korean Won’s rise? In a word, everything. At the moment, things couldn’t be going any better for the Korea Won. The economy is booming. The current account / trade surplus is on pace to surpass forecasts. The Central Bank has hiked its benchmark interest rate once already to 2.25%, and will probably hike again this month. In addition. even though Korean indebtedness is rising, “It is ranked 99th among 129 nations in terms of the ratio of public debt to the gross domestic product (GDP), which means the country’s balance sheet is healthier than most other nations in the world.” Added another analyst, “In this period where there’s a lot of concern about debtor nations, countries that are considered to have higher credit scores will benefit.”
While the Korean stock market has surged (13% this ear and 50% last year), it still remains 25% below its 2007 peak and is trading at valuations well below other Asian countries. It’s no wonder that foreign investors have been net buyers of Korean stocks: “Foreigners have bought more Korean shares than they sold every day for four weeks and net purchases for the year amount to some $13 billion.” It doesn’t hurt investors that the currency is appreciating and that interest rates are rising; at the moment, there really isn’t much downside from investing in Korea.

Meanwhile, the US (Federal Reserve Bank) is contemplating an expansion of its quantitative easing program, and other Central Banks may follow suit. Under the (now fading) paradigm of risk aversion, concerns of economic decline in the industrialized world would have been accompanied by a sell-off in emerging markets and capital flight to safe havens. As evidenced by the spike in the Korean Won and other emerging market currencies, such is no longer the case.
Enter the Bank of Korea (BOK). It is widely known that the South Korean economy is highly dependent on exports, which could be negatively impacted by a rising currency: “For every one percent gain of the won against the U.S. dollar, the nation’s export and gross domestic product decreases by 0.05 percent and 0.07 percent each.” Moreover, South Korea competes directly with Japan, which means the KRW-JPY exchange rate is of crucial importance to the Bank of Korea. Of course, both currencies had been appreciating at a similar clip. Once the Bank of Japan intervened, however, the BOK had no choice bu to double-down on its own efforts.
The Bank of Korea seems to appreciate that there is only so much it can do. Intervention is not cheap, and its foreign exchange reserves have since surged to $290 Billion. It is also not very effective, and the Korean Won has continued to rise. Finally, the currency intervention contradicts the BOK’s efforts to contain rising prices. By not raising interest rates and trying to hold its currency down, it risks stoking inflation. What’s more – South Korea is actually hosting this week’s G20 summit, at which currency intervention is expected to be a major topic of discussion. It would be awkward, to say the least, if Korea’s own currency intervention was broached.
Thus, it seems the Korean Won is destined to keep rising. It, too, is well below its 2007 peak, and there is scope for further appreciation. The BOK will continue to make token attempts at halting its rise, but at this point, the forces that is fighting against – bullish investors and other Central Banks – are too great.

Those who read the most recent Bank of International Settlements (BIS) Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange and Derivatives Market Activity know that daily forex turnover rose 20% over the last three years, to $4 Trillion. According to the official data, the vast majority of participants are financial institutions and the like, which would give the impression that overwhelming majority of trading is engaged in for speculative purposes. Anecdotal research, however, suggests that behind the scenes, it is “passive” foreign exchange trading that is making its presence known.
“According to Deutsche Bank, ‘passive’ players – such as corporate treasurers who are looking to hedge currency risk or to facilitate their core business, not to make a profit – account for more than 50 per cent of currency flows.” By definition, these passive players are not out to make a profit, and exchange currencies only because it is necessary to simply conduct business.
This is not surprising since the number of confirmed exporters in the US rose 10% during the last year for which data is available. It is almost a given that the number of exporters in emerging markets is increasing an an even faster clip. As a result, corporate banking departments are fighting to keep up with demand for currency exchange/hedging by such businesses, which simply want the ability to know their own profit margins in advance, and can set prices accordingly. Big corporations are among the most reliable hedgers: “Companies lifted the amount of estimated 12-month forward earnings hedged to 34.3 percent on average in September…boosted by a 22 percentage point rise in the U.S. corporations’ hedge ratio to 55.7 percent, the highest on record.” Even Sovereign Wealth funds are reportedly interested in hedging their forex reserves.
If not for the enormous pool of passive participation in forex, it might be difficult for speculators to turn a profit. ” ‘The flows from passive players have only limited direct sensitivity to broader market and macro factors, so they can serve as counterparts to investment theme-driven flows,’ ” reports the Financial Times. Since these participants are disinterested in actual forex fluctuations – so long as they can lock in exchange rates using spot and futures transactions – it creates passive momentum for currency movement, and hence opportunities for speculators (including retail forex traders) to turn a profit.
In some ways, this is a free lunch to speculators. On the one hand, double-digit currency moves have become so common over the last few years as to become almost mundane, with some currencies routinely rising or falling by more than 5% a month. On the other hand, forex volatility has fallen over time (except during the financial crisis) and is lower compared to other asset classes. For example, “Annualised average daily volatility of the euro/dollar pair over the past decade, for example, is 140 per cent lower than the volatility in the EuroStoxx 50 over the same period.” In addition, “JPMorgan’s index of implied volatility on options for Group of Seven currencies dropped 13 percent in the third quarter, after jumping 22 percent in the prior three months.” This is amazing, since it implies that as uncertainty has risen, risk (aka volatility) has fallen.
Interest in forex is also rising among indirect investors, such as pension funds, mutual funds, and retail investors that seek exposure to currency through investment products. “In July, RBC Capital Markets published a survey of 102 asset managers…which revealed that 38 per cent say currency tops the list of asset classes they are most likely to move into over the next 12 months, ahead of equities and commodities.” On a related note, most investment advisers recommend that currencies should comprise 2-7% of every investment portfolio, regardless of objective and tolerance to risk. The number of forex investment “specialists” and related investment products appear to be rising to meet demand variously based on carry, momentum and value strategies.
At this rate, it looks like forex volume will set a fresh record in 2013, when the next round of data is released.

Almost one month has passed since the Bank of Japan (BOJ) intervened in forex markets on behalf of the Japanese Yen. In one trading session, it spent a record 2.1249 trillion yen ($25.37 billion) to obtain a 3.5% jump in the Yen. Since then, the Yen has continued to appreciate, and now it seems like it’s only a matter of time before the BOJ intervenes again…and again and again.

Prior to intervening, Japan’s main concern was that there would be a bitter backlash from the rest of the world. On the one hand, Japan’s fears were validated by accusations that it was engaging in “currency war.” It also received a mild rebuke from US policymakers, who fretted that its intervention would cause China to reconsider allowing the Yuan to appreciate.
Others were more forgiving, however, going so far as to excuse Japan’s actions as a necessary response to Korean and Chinese intervention. After all, given that Japan competes directly with these two countries for export market share, how could it sit by idly as they actively devalued their currencies. US Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner let Japan completely off the hook by telling reporters that he didn’t think Japan “set the fire”for the current dynamic in forex markets.
Deutsche Bank(which created the chart below) added, “It must be frustrating for Japanese policymakers to see other Asian economics getting away with such persistent intervention to weaken their currencies. Perhaps the final straw was the Chinese purchases of JGBs [Japanese government Bonds] which some Japanese officials argue played a prominent role in the recent JPY appreciation.” In other words, not only was China holding down its currency against the Dollar, but now it had started to target the CNY/JPY exchange rate.

At next week’s G7 meeting, Japan will try to achieve a formal permission slip for its program, by arguing that, ” ‘Our intervention isn’t the kind of large-scale operations that aim to achieve certain rate levels over the long term.’ September’s intervention was only ‘aimed at curbing excess fluctuations’ in the yen’s rates.” Depending on how the G7 responds (via its official statement), it may influence the likelihood of further intervention.
From an economic standpoint, Japan also doesn’t have much to fear. The only downside from printing money wholesale and using it to buy US Dollars is the risk of inflation. In Japan, however, this would be seen as a positive development, and is hardly a constraint to further intervention: “With Japan’s economy still in the grip of deflation, the authorities have the ability and the incentive to prevent further gains in the yen.” In fact, the Bank of Japan recently “slashed its overnight ratetarget to virtually zero and pledged to purchase 5 trillion yen ($60 billion) worth of assets in a fresh dose of economic stimulus.” As the Fed prepares to do the same [more on that later this week], the BOJ’s hope is that this time around, “The yen won’t be reflexively favoured by investors turning bearish on the greenback.”
Really, then, the only question is when the BOJ will intervene. The Japanese Yen has already fallen below 82 USD/JPY, disappointing analysts that predicted the point of intervention would take place at 83/84, near the point of last month’s intervention. That it has allowed the Yen to continue to slide is somewhat baffling in that it exposes the futility of its previous efforts. The BOJ claims that it isn’t embarking on a program on continuous intervention, but this is really the only chance it has of being successful for any length of time. The Swiss National Bank (SNB) established a “line in the sand” of 1.50 EUR/SWF and spent $200 Billion defending it. Where is the the BOJ “line in the sand?” 82? 80?
In theory, this should mean that the Japanese Yen appreciation will soon come to an end. Given the fact that every other major currency (with the exception of the Euro) is being either indirectly or competitively devalued, however, this is far from certain. If Japan is serious about holding down the Yen, it may have to formally declare war.