XForex

According to Goldman Sachs (which if nothing else, is good at characterizing financial trends. Remember “BRIC?”), there is a “Wall of Money” that is already flooding emerging markets and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.
“The Institute of International Finance projected 2010 capital flows of $825 billion, up from $581 billion in 2009 and from the $709 billion that the trade group for global financial-services firms had projected for 2010 in April.” In hindsight, the outflow of capital from emerging markets that took place during the financial crisis will probably look like a blip, as risk appetite has already recovered to pre-crisis levels, and then some!
“The move into emerging markets has been led by stock investors, who will pour an estimated $186 billion into these countries this year, — fully three times the annual average of $62 billion generated between 2005 and 2009.” Emerging Market Bond funds, meanwhile, now routinely receive more than $1 Billion per week. Sovereign wealth funds are also starting to shift some of their assets into emerging market assets/currencies as part of their respective diversification strategies. As you can see from the chart below (courtesy of The Economist), Asia is by far the largest recipient of investment, followed by Latin America.

The continued shift of capital from the industrialized world into emerging markets as being driven both by economic fundamentals and the desire to earn a greater return on investment. “The IMF forecast this month that developing nations will expand 6.4 percent next year, outstripping growth of 2.2 percent among advanced economies.” Meanwhile, the ratio of foreign debt to GDP among developing nations has been cut to 26 percent, compared to 41 percent in 1999. And yet, even as analysts predict that emerging markets will account for 85% of global growth going forward, “emerging markets account for $3 trillion, or only 15 percent of market capitalisation of the benchmark MSCI world index.”
While it’s understandable, then, that investors would want to rectify this imbalance as quickly as possible, they need to realize that developing countries’ capital markets simply aren’t deep enough to absorb all of the incoming capital. In other words, an limited pool of capital is chasing a limited stock of accessible investments, and the result is that asset prices and exchange rates are climbing inexorably higher.
Analysts argue, “Some appreciation is due: a rise against rich-world currencies is both a natural consequence of the faster growth of emerging economies and a way to correct global imbalances.” But a 50% rise over five years (notched by a handful of currencies) does not represent some appreciation, but rather an explosion. This is precisely the sentiment echoed by many of the emerging markets, themselves, which have taken to using guerilla tactics to hold down their currencies. Since the latest phase of the “currency war” was ignited by Japan in September, every week has led to increasingly far-flung countries – Peru, Chile, Czech Republic, Poland, South Africa – reputedly contemplating intervention.
According to an interesting economic analysis, which scaled intervention to the size of the given country’s monetary base, South Korea and Taiwan have been among the most active participants in forex markets, while Thailand and Malaysia have been among the most restrained. This is born out by the sizable appreciation of both the Thai Baht and Malaysian Ringit over the last few years. However, I wonder if some economists will take issue with their assessment that Brazil and China have been relatively modest interveners.
Of course, this doesn’t make it any easier to forecast, since how a country behaved in the past isn’t necessarily indicative of how it will behave in the future. For example, Thailand just announced that it will not intervene, but Brazil will double its forex tax from 2% to 4%. Case in Point!

There are plenty of investors that think betting on China is as close to a sure thing as there could possibly be. The only problem is that investing directly in China’s economic freight train is complicated, opaque, and sometimes impossible. The Chinese government maintains strict capital controls, prohibits foreigners from directly owning certain types of investment vehicles, and prevents the Chinese Yuan from appreciating too quickly, if at all. For those that want exposure to China without all of the attendant risks, there is a neat alternative: the Australian Dollar (AUD).
Those of you that regularly read my posts and/or follow the forex markets closely should be aware of the many correlations that exist between currencies and other financial markets, as well as between currencies. In this case, there would appear to be a strong correlation between Chinese economic growth and the Australian Dollar. If the Chinese Yuan were able to float freely, it might rise and fall in line with the AUD. Since the Yuan is fixed to the US Dollar, however, we must look for a more roundabout connection. HSBC research analysts used Chinese electricity consumption as a proxy for Chinese economic activity (why they didn’t just use GDP is still unclear to me), and discovered that it fluctuated in perfect accordance with the Australian Dollar.
As one analyst summarized, “China is buying raw materials from Australia in leaps and bounds, and that’s what’s driving that currency’s growth.” Sounds like an Open and Shut case. In fact, this presumed correlation has become so entrenched that any indication that China is trying to cool its own economy almost always prompts a reaction in the Aussie. To be sure, warnings that China’s annual legislative conference (scheduled for October 17) would produce a consensus call for a tightening of economic policy have made some forecasters more conservative. Still, as long as the Chinese economy remains strong, the Australian Dollar should follow.
It’s worth pointing out that the correlation between the Aussie and the Chinese economy doesn’t exist in a vacuum. For example, the Australian Dollar has also closely mirrored the S&P 500 over the last decade, which suggests that global economic growth (and higher commodity prices) are as much of a factor in the Aussie’s appreciation as is Chinese economic activity. The Aussie is also vulnerable to a decline in risk appetite, like the kind that took place during the financial crisis and flared up again as a result of the EU Sovereign debt crisis. During such periods, Chinese demand for commodities becomes irrelevant.

In a few weeks, the US could overtake China as the world’s biggest currency manipulator. Don’t get me wrong: I’m not predicting that the US will officially enter the global currency war. However, I think that the expansion of the Federal Reserve Bank’s quantitative easing program (dubbed QE2 by investors) will exert the same negative impact on the Dollar as if the US had followed China and intervened directly in the forex markets.
For the last month or so, markets have been bracing for QE2. At this point it is seen as a near certainty, with a Reuters poll showing that all 52 analysts that were surveyed believe that is inevitable. On Friday, Ben Bernanke eliminated any remaining doubts, when he declared that, “There would appear — all else being equal — to be a case for further action.” At this point, it is only a question of scope, with markets estimates ranging from $500 Billion to $2 Trillion. That would bring the total Quantitative Easing to perhaps $3 Trillion, exceeding China’s $2.65 Trillion foreign exchange reserves, and earning the distinction of being the largest, sustained currency intervention in the world.
The Fed is faced with the quandary that its initial Quantitative Easing Program did not significantly stimulate the economy. It brought liquidity to the credit and financial markets – spurring higher asset prices – but this didn’t translate into business and consumer spending. Thus, the Fed is planning to double down on its bet, comforted by low inflation (currently at a 50 year low) and a stable balance sheet. In other words, it feels it has nothing to lose.
Unfortunately, it’s hard to find anyone who seriously believes that QE2 will have a positive impact on the economy. Most expect that it will buoy the financial markets (commodities and stocks), but will achieve little if anything else: “The actual problem with the economy is a lack of consumer demand, not the availability of bank loans, mortgage interest rates, or large amounts of cash held by corporations. Providing more liquidity for the financial system through QE2 won’t fix consumer balance sheets or unemployment.” The Fed is hoping that higher expectations for inflation (already reflected in lower bond prices) and low yields will spur consumers and corporations into action. Of course, it is also hopeful that a cheaper Dollar will drive GDP by narrowing the trade imbalance.
If the Dollar continues to fall, we could see a coordinated intervention by the rest of the world. Already, many countries’ Central Banks have entered the markets to try to achieve such an outcome. Individually, their efforts will prove fruitless, since the Fed has much deeper pockets. As one commentator summarized, It’s now becoming “awfully hypocritical for American officials to label the Chinese as currency manipulators? They are, but they’re not alone.”

Since touching a four-year low in June, the Euro has risen a whopping 19% against the Dollar – a veritable surge! One has to wonder, however, if perhaps the Euro hasn’t gotten ahead of itself in its race back upward.
The Euro’s nonstop rise has perplexed me. During the throes of the Eurozone Sovereign debt crisis, it seemed as if the Euro was headed back towards parity, if it even remained in existence! The European Commission’s $500 Billion bailout plan seemed to assuage the markets, but didn’t do much to mitigate against the risk of sovereign default. Besides, it looks like all of the austerity measures will be undone after the next election cycle. Opposition to further budgets is so vehement, and unemployment is so high (12% in Greece, 20% in Spain) that it will be difficult for leaders to stay in office if they continue to push an agenda that reduces their deficits.

As evidence that bond investors remain skeptical, consider that Greek debt still trades at a 700 basis point premium to German bonds. EU cheerleaders love to point to the fact that at-risk Eurozone countries are having no trouble tapping the credit markets, but that’s not really surprising when you consider the lofty returns that investors receive for buying bonds that are essentially backed by the good credit of the EU.
Even ignoring the fiscal problems of the EU, the economic picture is not pretty. “The Economist Intelligence Unit, in its just-released report…is forecasting that growth in Western Europe will reach only 1.1% next year, and at or below 1.7% at least through 2015, beyond which it wisely declines to look.” When you subtract out Germany – the engine of the EU economy -  GDP growth will be even more pathetic. And don’t even mention the peripheral economies, many of which are at serious risk for sliding back into recession.
Moreover, the European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy is just as loose as in other industrialized countries. Through its quantitative easing program, the ECB has injected hundreds of billions of Euros into the banking system and credit markets. Jean Claude Trichet, President of the ECB, bristled at the idea of ending this support: “No! This is not the position of the Governing Council, with an overwhelming majority.This non-standard measure…was designed to help restore a more normal functioning of our monetary policy transmission mechanism.”
On the other hand, the ECB is sterilizing all of its market intervention, which means that most of the funds that it is injected into the economy will remain in the EU. Contrast this with the Fed’s quantitative easing program (which hasn’t been sterilized) and you begin to understand why the Euro has held up well. In addition, Eurozone inflation currently exceeds US inflation (at a 50-year low), which means that the ECB will hesitate before following the Fed in easing monetary policy further.
Still, I don’t think there is a strong foundation for the Euro’s rise. It’s understandable that the expansion of the Fed’s quantitative easing program (“QE2″) is making investors nervous, causing them to send cash out of the US as a preventative measure. However, this seems a little too much like the tail wagging the dog, since until QE2 is officially implemented, all anticipatory shifts in capital flows are purely speculative – not fundamental. And as a fundamental analyst, that concerns me.
I think investors got ahead of themselves when they pushed the Euro down 20% over the first half of 2010, but now they are in danger of making the same mistake, and are pushing the Euro too far in the opposite direction. According to the most recent Commitment of Traders report, investors are building up long positions in the Euro, to the point that trading is becoming lopsided. I’m not much for short-term technical analysis, but when the Relative Strength Index (RSI) and Moving Average Convergence Divergence (MACD) are both approaching 2-year highs, it tells me that a correction is coming.

Among the major currencies, there are only a few that continue to sit on the side-lines, including the Euro (to a certain extent), Canadian Dollar, and Australian Dollar. For as long as the currency war continues, these currencies and the handful of emerging market currencies that have forsworn intervention will be the winners (at least from the point of view of speculators that deliberately bet on them).
Then there are those that believe all currencies will suffer, and that even the currencies that are still rising are actually depreciating in real terms (due to inflation). Those who harbor such beliefs will often try to short the entire currency market, usually by betting on commodities or heavy metals, of which Gold is probably the most prominent.
The price of Gold has risen more than 20% this year (in USD terms). Its backers claim that it is the ultimate store of value (where this derives from is unclear), and defend its lack of utility and inability to accrue interest by arguing that its appreciation is more than enough of a reason to own it. When you look at the performance of gold over the last five years, you begin to wonder if maybe they have a point.
Over the long-term, the picture is certainly more nuanced. I’m not going to explore the viability of fiat currencies here, but suffice it to say that, “Positioning for significantly higher gold prices over the long run demands a very bold strategic bet: that the global monetary system as we know it will completely break down and be replaced with a gold standard.” Regardless of the merits of this point of view, those that invest in Gold should at least understand that this is really the only justifiable reason to hold it. Those who are buying it because of the ongoing currency war will be disappointed.

In addressing the financial/credit/economic crisis, governments around the world have lowered interest rates, bailed-out bankrupt financial insititutions, engaged in wholesale money printing, guaranteed debt, and pumped cash into their economies. However, while such programs may have had some mitigating impact on the crisis, they did little to address the underlying cause. Specifically, debt was merely moved from one institution – one balance sheet – to another. Most of the bad debt that was at the heart of the credit crisis is still outstanding; the only thing that has changed is who is responsible for repaying it.
In many cases, it is governments which have assumed ownership of this debt. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac remain in a US government conservatorship. The Federal Reserve Bank owns more than $2 Trillion in US Treasuries and Mortgage Backed Securities. The European Union has agreed to collectively back more than $500 Billion in debt belonging to Greece and other unspecified “troubled” member states. The Japanese government has managed to pass off 90% of its sovereign debt onto its own citizens. The UK Treasury has printed money and lent it to the government of the UK. [The graphic below is actually interactive, and is worth a few minutes of perusing].

So what are the possibilities for dealing with this debt? In terms of government debt, the first is to hope that economies can grow faster than the debt, so that it becomes more manageable in relative terms and that one day it can be repaid. Another option is to raise taxes and/or cut spending, and use the extra funds to retire the debt. Given the current economic environment, the former possibility is unlikely. Industrialized economies continue to stall, and much of this growth is being funded with new debt. The latter option would amount to political suicide; any government that is politically naive enough to approve any austerity measures will be voted out of office at the next election. (With the election season about to begin, we won’t have to wait long for confirmation!)
The only alternative then is to reduce the real amount of debt through monetary inflation or currency depreciation. In the US, inflation is at a 50-year low. In Japan, it is non-existent. In the UK and the EU, prices are hardly growing. Monetary policymakers around the world are now actively trying to spur inflation (for reasons unrelated to the reduction of debt), but to no avail. Interest rates are already at rock bottom, and Central Banks have injected Billions of newly minted money into circulation without any impact on prices.
Currency devaluation is already taking place, but the main participants are emerging market economies (which are incidentally more concerned about export competitiveness than reducing the size of the debts). The Japanese Yen is nearing an all-time high, while the Euro has recovered from its spring lows. The British Pound is near its long-term average, while the US Dollar has declined only slightly on a trade-weighted average. In the end, since all of these countries are characterized by high levels of debt, it would be impossible for all of them to devalue their currencies. In addition, the nature of the Euro currency union precludes Eurozone countries from being able to lower their debts through currency devaluation.
The story is the same for private debt. For example, most of the real estate (commercial and residential) debt associated with the collapse of the housing market has yet to be written off. Financial institutions and investors continue to hold onto it with the hope that the real estate market will soon recover, such that the losses will never need to be recognized. While this strategy could vindicate lenders/investors over the long-term, it continues to have a devastating effect in the short-term since it forces the holders of debt to keep more cash on their balance sheets, where it won’t find its way into the global economy.

What are the implications for forex markets? Namely, it would seem to support the notion that emerging market currencies will continue to outperform the G4 currencies over the long-term. Over the near-term, it’s possible that G4 currencies will experience some appreciation, due both to the ebb and flow of risk appetite and the interventions of emerging market Central Banks on behalf of their currencies. Over the long-term, however, the only realistic alternative to default is currency devaluation, and at some point, the forex markets will have to come to terms with the fact that the G4 currencies need to decline. [Chart above courtesy of The Economist].

Most of today’s headlines regarding the Japanese Yen focus on one thing: Central Bank intervention. Basically, reporters have become focused on the likelihood of additional intervention in the currency markets by the Bank of Japan. However, this obsession has caused them to overlook the larger issue: Why is the Yen still rising?

I was prompted to ask this question after coming across the above chart, which tracks the historical performance of the Japanese Yen against the US Dollar. You can see that since 1970, the Yen has risen by a whopping 350% against the Dollar. It has doubled in value since 1990 and risen 14% since the start of the year, en route to a 15-year high. Over the same period (actually since 1980; I couldn’t find data from the 1970), Japan’s economy has expanded by an average annualized growth rate of 2.2%. Over the last 10 years, the average is a paltry .9%. The contradiction between fundamentals and reality could not be more stark!
In addition, investor risk appetite has been reinvigorated. During most of the last decade, carry trading caused the Yen to decline to 120 USD/JPY as investors borrowed Yen in bulk in order to purchase high-yielding assets. The credit crisis spurred a short squeeze (i.e. rapid unwinding of carry trade positions) in early 2007, and caused the Yen to rocket upward. If anything, we would expect the Yen to mirror its performance of a few years ago, as investors take advantage of low Japanese interest rates and rebuild carry trade positions in the Yen.
The recent run-up in emerging market currencies, global equities, commodities, and other risky assets would certainly seem to support a carry trade strategy. For its part, the Bank of Japan is also doing its best to create a healthy environment for carry trading by printing currency, easing monetary policy, and fighting to keep the Yen from rising. And yet, if indeed there are still carry traders (and there certainly are!), the current trend in forex markets suggests that they are very much outnumbered by those betting on the Yen’s rise.
It’s difficult to understand this phenomenon. Those that hold Yen earn a nominal return of near 0%. Long-term interest rates (proxied by 10-year government bonds) are only slightly higher – at 1% – and certainly too low to attract any foreign institutional interest. Besides, it’s well-known that 90% of Japanese government debt is held by domestic savers. Meanwhile, the Japanese stock market has stagnated for more than 2 decades, and the Nikkei average is lower than at any point since 1985 (except for a brief period following the dot-com bust. Japanese real estate is equally unattractive.
As a result, there are only two conceivable reasons for the Yen’s continued upward push. The first is fundamental/structural and is connected to Japan’s trade surplus. In spite of an appreciating currency, the Japanese export sector continues to be the lone bright spot in an economy with otherwise limited sources of growth. Compared to 2009, the trade surplus is up 83%, helped by a rise of 50% in September. It is on pace to top $100 Billion for the year. In this regard, foreigners that buy Japanese Yen do so because they must- for purposes of trade.
The second source of demand for Japanese Yen is so-called safe haven flows. While the Japanese Yen is not a high-yielding currency, it is actually an excellent store of value. [This is one of the three primary functions that a currency should fulfill. The other two are medium of exchange and unit of account]. That’s because inflation in Japan is the lowest in the world, often to the point of being nil. Since 1970, the inflation rate has averaged only 3%, compared to 4.5% in the US. Over the last 15 years, inflation has been 0%. In other words, even if they are invested in low-yielding savings accounts, Japanese savers can ensure that 1 Yen today will probably still be worth 1 Yen 5 years from now. Foreign investors can take advantage of the same phenomenon, when they bet that the exchange value of the Yen will be equally stable.
On the one hand, it is somewhat surprising that the Yen has been able to thrive in the current “risk-on” investing climate. On the other hand, there is a parallel thread of risk-aversion that will always exist and gravitate towards safe-haven currencies, such as the Yen. In fact, it can be argued that this contingent of investors is as large as the risk-taking contingent, as evidenced by the inexorable appreciation of gold (if not also by the Yen). Insofar as inflation in Japan remains nil and the Japanese export sector proves it can be competitive regardless of exchange rates, demand for Yen will continue to confound the gloomy forecasts and rebuff the best efforts of the Bank of Japan.