XForex

Today, we bring you an interview with Marc Chandler, the global head of currency strategy for Brown Brothers Harriman. Previously he was the chief currency strategist for HSBC Bank USA and Mellon Bank. Marc is a prolific writer and speaker whose essays have been published in the Financial Times, Barron’s, Euromoney, Corporate Finance, and Foreign Affairs. He is also the contributing economic editor for Active Trader Magazine and to TheStreet.Com. Below, he shares his thoughts on fundamental analysis versus technical analysis, the false Euro rally, Japanese Yen intervention, and other subjects.
Forex Blog: I would would like to begin by asking you to briefly explain your approach to analyzing the forex markets. Do you prefer technical or fundamental analysis, or a combination of both?

I’ve been analyzing currencies for a while, more than 20 years. I tend to think of myself as a fundamentalist, that is I look at macroeconomics, I look at policy, but at the same time, I’m a strategist, so I’m not just forecast GDP or trade. Ultimately, my goal is try to see where the currencies are going themselves, like the Euro or the Yen, or the Canadian Dollar. I find that technical analysis helps me quantify the risk at what level do I admit I’m wrong. And that’s very important. I think that often times, one would think that with economists, it’s always about being right. And I think that with trading and strategy, risk management is the most important thing. I find that technical analysis tells me where I should put my stop in effect – where I should admit that I’m wrong, unlike fundamentalists that say any level of US GDP or trade balance, the Dollar could be all over the place. Tehcnicals help me identify, help me fine-tune that a bit. I think that trading is so difficult that I need to use all of the possible tools that I have had at my disposal. It’s not just fundamental knowledge, but also studying psychology and price action.

Forex Blog: As head of currency research for Brown Brothers Harriman, it looks like you cover most of the major currencies, as well as a handful of emerging/exotic currencies. What do you think about the macroeconomic gulf that is forming between the “G4″ economies (US, UK, Eurozone, Japan) and the emerging market economies (along the lines of debt, GDP growth, etc.)? Do you think that this division is reflected in forex markets?

Most of my career, I’ve focused on the major currencies, but to tell you the truth, it’s kind of blurry what’s an emerging market, especially with all that’s come to light during this crisis. Mexico, for example, Israel and South Korea are OECD countries and yet MSCI and some of these other investment agencies might consider them emerging market, so the line is really blurry.

For example, recently, the Bank of Japan intervened and they bought a lot of US Dollars. But it’s not clear to me – because the Chinese currency is so closely tied to the US Dollar – it’s not clear to me that maybe Japan wasn’t just as concerned, or even more concerned with the Yen against the RMB – since China is its biggest trading partners – as with the Yen against the Dollar. But they had to intervene on Dollar/Yen because of the way the foreign exchange market works and because China’s currency is not convertible.

While I tend to focus on the major countries, I don’t really know how to do the job and think about the world and global capital markets without recognizing and integrating what’s going on in many of the major emerging markets.

Forex Blog:  Do you develop your own macroeconomic forecasts or do you simply plug in the data that your economist colleagues have developed?

 Brown Brothers doesn’t really have a global economist- they’re not that kind of bank. So when it comes to GDP, for example, I will not have a formal forecast for it. I will have a guess of it and I’ll shy one way or the other from the broad market consensus. So for example, the broad market consensus for Q3 US GDP is about 1.9%. I would think of myself as a little bit above there. The important thing for the markets is instead of forecasting GDP as the end result, my end result is the Dollar or the Euro. And I would be looking at GDP, at relative economic strength as one of the inputs in an informal exchange rate model.

I would say that the emerging markets typically grow faster than the industrialized, mature economies. I find that faster emerging market growth – to me that’s more like a “dog bites man” story.  This crisis, unlike past crises, from 1995-2002, these were emerging market crises: East Asia, Latin America…this is among the first crises that originated in industrialized countries.

Many of the emerging market economies have strong domestic demand, so they were able to compensate for the weakness in foreign demand. But they’ve also benefited from the terms of trade: higher commodity prices than manufactured goods prices. I think in general, that many people look at the debt levels of advanced, industrialized countries and worry that the US is becoming Greece or Argentina. I think that kind of thinking is misguided. It confuses things. It confuses cyclical comparisons with structural developments. I think there’s no doubt that the US is not Argentina. The Dollar is a major reserve currency. Most trade is invoiced in US Dollars – even when Australia sells iron ore to China, it’s probably invoiced in US Dollars and paid in US Dollars – not Argentinian Pesos or Mexican Pesos or whatever the current threat to the US Dollar is.

Forex Blog: Based on this, then, you don’t see any inherent contradiction between the Dollar’s strength and the gap in growth fundamentals between the US and emerging markets?

Since the opening up of China, for example, in the late ‘70s, China has definitely grown faster than the US. I’d say that’s also true form many Latin American countries like Brazil. Of course they grow much faster than the US, Europe, and Japan. But sometimes what determines currencies are not relative growth differentials. If you think about what’s happened since Lehman’s collapse, the Japanese Yen has been the strongest currency, and I don’t think that’s because of strong  Japanese economic fundamentals. I think it has to do more with the unwinding of carry trades – Japan being a current account surplus country – that seems to be more telling than saying they have a booming economy, which of course they don’t. There’s no free lunches; the reason Brazil, Turkey, and South Africa offer higher interest rates is to compensate investors for some of the risk (political risk, inflation risk, maybe even historic risk – that you couldn’t depend on these counties in the past, and the market has to anticipate issues going forward). For example, Brazil (Real) is one of peoples’ favorite currencies, and the budget deficit is at an 8 month high, and they are approaching a current account deficit. So when I hear about fundamentals, it kind of begs the question, ‘Well, which fundamentals should be reflected, and what happens if the fundamentals are pointing in contradictory directions?’

Forex Blog: Is there a particular (emerging) currency that you think is not getting enough attention?

I’m looking for an opportunity to buy the Brazilian Real, although I think it could weaken first. I also like India – I think they’re the tortoise compared to the rabbit of China. I like Malaysia. I like Columbia. I like China. We generally think that in the emerging market space, Asian currencies over time, will appreciate against the US Dollar. They have favorable dynamics, pulled into the Chinese economic orbit, still tied to the US tech cycle, strong underlying economic fundamentals, and pressure to raise interest rates.

Forex Blog: On your financial blog, Marc to Market, a recent post was entitled, “The Yen Conundrum.” Can you elaborate on the contradiction between weak Japanese fundamentals and the strong Yen? Do you expect the trends in capital flows that are arguably behind the Yen’s appreciation will reverse anytime soon?

To me, the Yen’s strength is kind of like a thermometer – a temperature check for a sick patient. I suspect that the Yen’s strength is a function of the deleveraging taking place in the world. When the deleveraging stops, I will be more confident that the Yen has peaked. I’m not sure that is the case yet. I think intervention kind of caught some people by surprise. They spent a lot of money to get the kind of advance they got. They got 3-Yen advance – about a 5% move. The big picture is that it might lose some strength, but gradually.

Forex Blog: Speaking of the Yen, the Bank of Japan recently “intervened” on its behalf. Do you expect that this is only the beginning of a long program of intervention? Given the poor track record of the Swiss National Bank (in terms of the Franc), do you think that other Central Banks may follow suit?

This was a unilateral intervention. There are people who say that this opens up a Pandora’s Box for other countries to intervene, but I don’t think so. I think that those Central Banks that were inclined to intervene have already been intervening, like some Asian Central Banks and like Brazil. They continue to intervene. I think that it’s unusual for a G7 country to intervene. I don’t think that any other G7 country will intervene, though earlier this year and last year, though Switzerland did intervene quite actively and aggressively as part of their quantitative easing. With Japan, it does depend on the Yen/Dollar. However, the Japanese Yen intervention was quite large, and usually the first intervention is the biggest intervention. It’s been a week now, and they haven’t been in. Since that Thursday, the low that we’ve been at was 85.25 and we’re just above there right now. But it does not appear that they are sterilizing intervention, though it’s hard to tell because of the volatility caused by it being the end of the fiscal half year. Generally speaking, I think that the Japanese are not committing yet- they bought just short of 20 Trillion Yen – about $2 Billion – and I don’t think that’s enough yet to have really changed the general tide in Dollar/Yen. I think the deleveraging process has more ways to work and it’s bigger than 20 Billion Dollars.

Forex Blog: When the Euro rallied in the beginning of the summer, a number of forex commentators (myself included) declared a paradigm shift, whereby investors would stop worrying about risk and instead focus on the fundamentals. Ultimately, this shift never materialized, and the Euro appears to have resumed its decline. What is your assessment of the Euro’s recent performance, and what can we expect for the immediate future?

I think that the Euro’s bounce over the summer was a function of people taking a step back from the abyss. In the spring, it maybe looked like the Eurozone would collapse and members would drop out. When people realized that the Euro would survive and institutions would be reformed, the Euro bounced back a bit.

I think that we’re kind of caught now between problems in Europe – I think that risk assessment is fundamental. I do think that most recently, the widening of the spreads in Europe has not read to new Euro weakness, that being said, it might be preventing a serious Euro rally. We’re still about 2 cents below where we were in August. On the other hand, the Dollar has stood on 2 legs. One is bad things in Rest of World (ROW) and the other is good things here. But those good things have faded, and quite quickly in Q2. And so my equilibrium level for the Euro if there is such a thing is probably a bit higher than at the beginning of the year, about 1.33 – 1.35 to the Dollar.

You also have to look at restructuring of Euro debt, and ask, ‘How did Greece live beyond its means.’ The answer is that they were buying lots of goods and German Banks were happily lending them the money to do so. In fact, 70% of Greek debt is owned by non-residents. Going forward, the problems can only be overcome by stronger growth, which doesn’t seem likely at the moment. Still, assuming that interest rate differentials (between Germany and the rest of the EU) narrow, we will see the Euro strengthen.

Forex Blog: I recall a Bloomberg News video segmentin which you highlighted the 200-day moving average as an important forex indicator, especially for investors with a long-term outlook. Could you explain this for the benefit of my readers? Are there any other basic technical analysis indicators that you think fundamental analysts should pay attention to?

First I just want to say that we must appreciate time frame. For example, most fund managers have a medium time frame, and it doesn’t make sense for them to look at daily bar charts. That’s really just false symbolism, noise.

I like the 200 day Moving Average because it gives you a sense of trend. I think I remember the Bloomberg story that you’re referring to. I was looking at 250 day Moving Averages, and the idea of what some people call Golden Crosses. The idea is that the 50-day Moving Average has gone below the 250 Day Moving Average, in the Swiss Franc and the Pound. If you look at the Euro/Dollar exchange rate, the last time this happened was when the Euro was launched in 1999, and it led to a large sell-off. As I aid though, you have to ultimately look at time frame.

Forex Blog: I haven’t read your book, but I’m intrigued by the title: “Making Sense of the Dollar: Exposing Dangerous Myths about Trade and Foreign Exchange.” Are there any particular foreign exchange myths that are especially pertinent and that you’d like to share?

The thesis of my book is that US Dollar expansion strategy is more robust than friends and enemies insist. For example, I look at the current account deficit. People say it makes us poorer but I show that’s not really the case. People think that companies service foreign demand through exporting, but they should be looking at sales from US affiliates, which have been 4 times as much as exports. In other words, build locally sell locally.

Forex Blog: What is your advice for (forex) investors that want to beat the market during these uncertain times?

Well I think that forex investor is an oxymoron, but anyway, there is a misconception that traders win by being right more than they are wrong. I think you win through discipline. That means honoring your stops and limiting your losses. Entry and exit levels are less important than discipline.

I started looking at currencies around the time the Plaza Accord was signed, and since then, I can’t remember ever seeing certainty in the currency markets. You can make a case for bonds and stocks being connected with the business cycle, but the forex connection is more elastic, more variable. I think that this is an advantage for currency traders because it means they are accustomed to uncertainty.

The last time I travelled to Thailand, in 2004, the Baht was trading around 40 USD/THB, compared to the current exchange rate of 30.7. That’s pretty incredible when you consider that during the intervening time, Thailand experienced a military coup and related political instability, as well as a financial crisis that dealt an especially heavy blow to the world’s emerging market currencies. And yet, if you chart the Baht’s performance against the Dollar, you would have only the faintest ideas that either of these crises took place.
To be sure, the financial crisis exacted a heavy toll on Thai financial markets and the Thai economy. Stock and bond prices lurched downward, as foreign investors moved cash into so-called safe haven currencies, such as the US Dollar and Japanese Yen. However, the Thai economy was among the first to emerge from recession, expanding in 2009, and surging in 2010. “Compared with a year earlier, GDP rose 9.1%, while the economy grew 10.6% in the first half,” according to the most recent data.  Tourism, one of the country’s pillar industries, has already recovered, along with exports and consumption. Projected export growth of 27% is expected to drive the economy forward at 7-7.5% in 2010, according to both the IMF and Thai government projections. The consensus is that growth would have been even more spectacular (perhaps 1-2% higher) if not for the politcal protests, which were finally quelled in May of this year.
Despite concerns about risk and volatility, foreign investors are once again pouring funds in Thailand at a record pace. Over $1.4 Billion has been pumped into the stock market alone in the year-to-date. As a result, “Thailand’s benchmark SET Index has rebounded30 percent since May…helping send the SET to its highest level since November 1996.” Capital inflows are also being spurred by Thai interest rates, which are rising (the benchmark is currently at 1.75%), even while rates in the industrialized world remain flat.  At this point, the cash coming into Thailand well exceeds the cash going out, which remains low due to steady imports and restrictions on capital outflows by Thai individuals and institutions. This imbalance is reflected in the Central Bank of Thailand’s forex reserves, which recently topped $150 Billion, more than 50% of GDP.
Anticipation is building that Thailand will use some its reserves to try to halt, or even reverse the appreciation of the Baht. After last week’s intervention by the Bank of Japan, such intervention is now seen not only as being more acceptable, but also more necessary. Due to pressure from the Prime Minister, the Central Bank has convened at least one emergency meeting to determine the best course of action. So far, members can only agree that restrictions on capital flows and lending standards to exporters should be relaxed.
For what it’s worth, Thailand’s richest man has urged the Central Bank not to act: “The effort is likely fruitless as foreign capital is expected to incessantly flood into Thailand because of the country’s healthy economic recovery and export growth. The baht as a matter of fact should become even stronger should Thailand’s politics remain in normal condition.” He is supported by the facts, which show that the Thai export sector has held up just fine in the face of the rising Baht, though perhaps only because other Asian currencies have risen at a comparable pace.
If other Central Banks were to step up their intervention – (Deutsche Bank has argued, via the chart below, that all “Asian central banks have for many years been more or less persistently in the market “stabilizing” their currencies, but with a clear bias towards preventing USD depreciation in this region”) – the Bank of Thailand would probably have no choice but to follow suit.
Otherwise, it might not be long before the Baht clears 30 USD/THB. My next post on the Baht, in 2015, will probably be in the form of a similar lamentation…

The Chinese Yuan has touched a new high, at 6.69 USD/CNY. Given that the Yuan has still only risen about 2% since the peg was officially loosened in June -  with most of that appreciation taking place in the last couple weeks – there still remains intense pressure on China to do more.
Last week’s intervention by the Bank of Japan diverted a tremendous amount of attention towards the Yuan. In fact, many analysts have argued that it is only because of the Yuan-Dollar peg (itself, as well as the Chinese purchases of Yen assets that it engendered) that Japan was forced to act: ” ‘Countries see that getting involved in currency manipulation is a way to give themselves an advantage’…’China, their actions affected Japan, and Japan is affecting us.’ ” The Yen intervention could also force the G20 to re-focus its attention on the Yuan, and at least devote some discussion to it at the next summit.

It should be noted that the two soundbites above both emanated from US Congressmen, which is important because the US government is currently mulling action on the Yuan currency peg. Politicians are growing tired by the Treasury Department’s repeated failure to call China a “Currency Manipulator,” which would require diplomatic talks and even trade sanctions. The Treasury will have an opportunity redeem itself in its next report on foreign exchange, due out on October 15, but it is expected that the report will either be delayed or released without adequately addressing the undervalued Yuan.
In fact, Treasury Secretary Geithner testified before Congress last week, and at least admitted that something needed to be done: “The pace of appreciation has been too slow and the extent of appreciation too limited. We have to figure out ways to change behavior.” However, this was only in response to acerbic criticism – (Senator Schumer told him, “I’m increasingly coming to the view that the only person in this room who believes China is not manipulating its currency is you.”) – and he ultimately failed to outline a timetable/blueprint for action. Despite the consensus among politicians (and President Obama) that the currency peg is harmful to the US economy, Geithner made it clear that the Treasury Department continues to favor unilateral action towards dealing with problem, without Congressional intervention. For now, then, politicians are probably relegated to saber-rattling and name-calling.
China’s response to this charade has been predictable. Trade representatives hinted that China wouldn’t bow to external pressure, and that any attempt at “punishment” would be met with countervailing actions. China also questioned the economics between arguments that the Dollar peg contributes to trade imbalance, calling such claims “groundless.” This position is actually supported by the notion that while the Yuan appreciated by 20% against the Dollar from 2005-2008, the US/China trade deficit actually widened.
In practice, China is likely to stick to its policy of gradual Yuan appreciation, or a few reasons. First of all, while Chinese policymakers know that they don’t need to wholly appease US politicians, they at least need to pretend that they are listening. It’s true that the US is dependent on Chinese products and its purchases of Treasury Bonds. However, it is arguably just as dependent on the US to buy its exports, which promotes employment and social stability, and it is keen to avoid a trade war if possible.
Second, a long-term appreciation of the RMB is actually in China’s best interest. If it wants to spur domestic consumption and promote more value-added manufacturing, it will need a more valuable currency. Outbound M&A, especially involving natural resource companies, will also be more economical if the Yuan is worth more. Also, if China has any serious ambitions of turning the Yuan into a global reserve currency, it will need to create capital markets that are deeper and more liquid, which it is currently unmotivated to do, lest it spur demand for Yuan by foreign institutional investors.
Finally, China should let the Yuan appreciate because it is financially gainful to do so. As I mentioned above, its trade surplus with the US has widened over the last few years as prices for its exports grow along with quantity. Meanwhile, prices for imports and prices paid for commodities and other natural resources have declined in Yuan-terms. For that reason, I think China will probably continue to stick its current policy, and allow the RMB to continue to slowly inch up.

Wouldn’t life just be a little easier if the EUR/USD, the most important forex pair and bellwether of currency markets, could simply pick a direction and stick to it. It dove during the financial crisis, only to surge during the apparent recovery phase, fell during the sovereign debt crisis, and rose during the paradigm shift, then fell as risk appetite waned, only to rise again in September, en route to a 5-month high.
There are certainly those that argue that the Euro’s recent surge reflects renewed confidence in the Eurozone economy and prospects for resolving the EU debt crisis. After all, most Euro members will reduce their budget deficits in 2010 and auctions of new bonds are once again oversubscribed. On the other hand, interest rates for the PIGS (Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain) have risen to multi-year highs, as investors are finally trying to make a serious effort at pricing the possibility of default.
As every analyst has pointed out, none of the EU’s fiscal problems have been solved. EU members have certainly proven adept at resolving acute crises and the ECB certainly deserves credit for keeping credit markets functioning, but none has proposed a viable solution for repairing of member countries’ fiscal and economic health. Currency devaluation is impossible. Sovereign default is being prevented. That leaves wage cuts and increased productivity as the only two paths to equilibrium. The former could be accomplished through inflation, but the ECB seems reluctant to allow this to happen.
For better or worse, the EU seems to have pushed these problems down the road, and if all goes according to plan, they won’t need to be revisited for 2-3 years. For now, then, the Euro is probably safe, and may even thrive. Short positions in the Euro are being unwound with furious speed and data indicate that there is still plenty of scope for further unwinding. Inflation remains subdued, economic growth is stable, and the ECB so far hasn’t voiced any disapproval of the Euro’s rise. While I promote this bullishness with the caveat that “traders have shown a willingness to smack the euro lower from time to time on the slightest news or rumor of downgrades to euro-zone sovereign or bank ratings,” the general Euro trend is now unquestionably UP.

Brazil is beating the drumbeat of war. The forex variety, that is. According to the Finance Minister, “We’re in the midst of an international currency war, a general weakening of currency. This threatens us because it takes away our competitiveness.” By its own admission, Brazil will not be sitting on the sidelines of this war. Rather, it will do battle on behalf of its currency, the Real.
It’s not hard to understand why the Real is soaring. Its benchmark Selic rate is 10.75%, with government bonds yielding an even higher 12%. Even after controlling inflation, this is the highest among major currencies. Its economy is booming; GDP is projected at 10% in 2010. As a result, capital flow inflows have returned to pre-credit crisis levels: “Net foreign-exchange inflows totaled $11.14 billion in the September 1-17 period, up from $2.11 billion in the first 10 days of the month, according to data released Tuesday by the country’s central bank.” The inflows have been driven by a $70 Billion stock offering by PetroBras, the (formerly) state-owned oil company. It is a record sum, and over 3 times bigger than the eye-popping $23 Billion the Agricultural Bank of China raised only a few months ago. “If the Petrobras deal had never happened, the real might currently be trading somewhere around 1.75 per dollar,” compared to 1.70 today. With other companies rushing to follow suit with debt and equity offerings, cash will probably continue to pour in.
As I said at the beginning of this post, the Bank of Brazil has several tools up its sleeve. It has already resumed “surprise daily auctions to buy excess dollars in the spot market” (suspended in 2006), in which investors can trade Dollars for Brazilian government debt. It is also proposing reverse currency swaps, which would serve a similar purpose. ” ‘The order is to buy, buy and buy,’ ” said a government source. It has purchased nearly $1 Billion in foreign currency in the month of September alone, and has pledged to deploy its $10 Billion Sovereign investment fund if necessary. Finally, there is talk of raising the tax rate (currently 2%) on all foreign capital inflows, though there is no real timetable for such a move.
Alas, while the government of Brazil is certainly sincere in its intentions to hold down the Real, it lacks the wherewithal. Its $1 Billion intervention in September was dwarfed by the $20+ Billion spent by the Bank of Japan in one day to hold down the Yen. Even controlling for the difference in the size of their respective economies, Brazil has still been thoroughly outspent. Its $10 Billion investment fund pales in comparison to the ~$1 Trillion forex reserves of Japan. In short, Brazil would be wise to avoid full-fledged engagement in currency war.

On September 27, Brazilian Finance Minister, Guido Montega, used the term “currency war” to describe the series of recent Central Bank interventions in forex markets. While he may not have intended it, the term stuck, and financial journalists everywhere have run wild with it.
In the current cycle (dating back a couple years), more than a dozen Central Banks have entered the forex markets with the intention of holding down their respective currencies, both against each other and also against the US Dollar. What makes it a war is that the Central Banks are fighting to outspend and outdo each other. It is a War of Attrition, in that Central Banks will fight until they’ve exhausted all of their wherewithal, conceding defeat for their currencies. On the other hand, unlike in a conventional war, there aren’t any alliances, nor is there much in the way of little strategy. Central Banks simply buy large blocks of counter currencies and hope their own currencies will then depreciate on the spot market. In addition, since the counter currencies are almost always Dollars and/or Euros, the participants in this war are not even competing directly against each other, but rather against an enemy that isn’t doing much to fight back. [Chart belowcourtesy of Der Spiegel].
The Swiss National Bank (SNB) was the first to intervene, and staged a one-year campaign over the course of 2009 to hold the Swiss Franc at 1.50 against the Euro. Ultimately, it failed when the sovereign debt crisis caused an exodus of Euro selling. The Bank of Brazil was next, although its interventions havebeen more modest; it seems to have accepted the ultimate futility of its efforts, and will seek to slow the Real’s appreciation rather than halt it. Last month, the Bank of Japan spent $20 Billion in one session in order to show the markets how serious it is about fighting the Yen’s rise. In fact, it was this intervention that sparked Montega’s comments about currency war. (The BOJ hasn’t intervened since). All along, the People’s Bank of China has continued to add to its war chest of reserves – currently $2.5 Trillion – as part of the ongoing Yuan-Dollar peg. And of course, there have been a handful of smaller interventions (South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan) and no shortage of rhetorical (Canada, South Africa) interventions, as well as indirect (US, UK) intervention.
That’s right- don’t forget that the Fed and the Bank of England, through their respective quantitative easing programs, have injected Trillions into the financial markets and caused their currencies to weaken. In a sense, all of the subsequent interventions have been effected in order to restore the equilibrium in the currency markets that was lost when these two Central Banks deflated there currencies through wholesale money printing. Since much of this cash has found its way into emerging markets (See chart below), you can’t blame their Central Banks from trying to soften some of the upward pressure on their currencies.
It’s still too early too early to say how far the currency war will go. The G7/G20 has announced that it will address the issue at its next summit, though it probably won’t lead to much in the way of action. Ultimately, politicians can’t do much more than shake their fingers at countries that try to hold down their currencies. In the case of the Yuan-Dollar peg, American politicians have tried to take this one step further by threatening to slap China with punitive trade sanctions, but this probably won’t come to pass and may disappear as an issue altogether after the November elections. As I reported on Friday, Brazil has taken matters into its own hands by taxing all foreign capital inflows, but this hasn’t had much effect on the Real.
That brings me to my final point, which is that all currency intervention is futile in the long term, because most Central Banks have limited capacity to intervene. If they print too much money to hold down their currencies, they risk stoking inflation. Of course China is the exception to this rule, but this is less because of the size of its war chest and more because of the mechanics of its exchange rate regime. For Central Banks to successfully manipulate their currencies on the spot market, they must fight against the Trillions of Dollars in daily forex turnover. Eventually, every Central Bank must reckon with this truism.
In terms of identifying the winners and losers of the currency war (as I promised to do in the title of this post, the Euro will probably lose (read: appreciate) because the ECB is not willing to participate. The same goes for the Swiss Franc, since the SNB has basically forsaken currency intervention for the time being. The Bank of Japan has deep pockets, and if the markets push the Yen back up above 85 Yen/Dollar, I wouldn’t be surprised to see it intervene again. With the Fed mulling an expansion of its quantitative easing program, meanwhile, the Dollar will probably continue to sink. And as for the countries that are doing the actual intervening, they might succeed in temporarily holding down the valuer of their respective currencies.  As capital shifts to emerging markets over the long-term, however, their currencies will soon resume rising.

The Bank of Korea is one of the major participants in the ongoing global currency war, intervening on behalf of the Won to the tune of $1 Billion per day! Meanwhile, the Korean Won has risen 5% in the last month, and 10% over the last three months, the highest in Asia. What a disconnect!
First of all, what’s behind the Korean Won’s rise? In a word, everything. At the moment, things couldn’t be going any better for the Korea Won. The economy is booming. The current account / trade surplus is on pace to surpass forecasts. The Central Bank has hiked its benchmark interest rate once already to 2.25%, and will probably hike again this month. In addition. even though Korean indebtedness is rising, “It is ranked 99th among 129 nations in terms of the ratio of public debt to the gross domestic product (GDP), which means the country’s balance sheet is healthier than most other nations in the world.” Added another analyst, “In this period where there’s a lot of concern about debtor nations, countries that are considered to have higher credit scores will benefit.”
While the Korean stock market has surged (13% this ear and 50% last year), it still remains 25% below its 2007 peak and is trading at valuations well below other Asian countries. It’s no wonder that foreign investors have been net buyers of Korean stocks: “Foreigners have bought more Korean shares than they sold every day for four weeks and net purchases for the year amount to some $13 billion.” It doesn’t hurt investors that the currency is appreciating and that interest rates are rising; at the moment, there really isn’t much downside from investing in Korea.

Meanwhile, the US (Federal Reserve Bank) is contemplating an expansion of its quantitative easing program, and other Central Banks may follow suit. Under the (now fading) paradigm of risk aversion, concerns of economic decline in the industrialized world would have been accompanied by a sell-off in emerging markets and capital flight to safe havens. As evidenced by the spike in the Korean Won and other emerging market currencies, such is no longer the case.
Enter the Bank of Korea (BOK). It is widely known that the South Korean economy is highly dependent on exports, which could be negatively impacted by a rising currency: “For every one percent gain of the won against the U.S. dollar, the nation’s export and gross domestic product decreases by 0.05 percent and 0.07 percent each.” Moreover, South Korea competes directly with Japan, which means the KRW-JPY exchange rate is of crucial importance to the Bank of Korea. Of course, both currencies had been appreciating at a similar clip. Once the Bank of Japan intervened, however, the BOK had no choice bu to double-down on its own efforts.
The Bank of Korea seems to appreciate that there is only so much it can do. Intervention is not cheap, and its foreign exchange reserves have since surged to $290 Billion. It is also not very effective, and the Korean Won has continued to rise. Finally, the currency intervention contradicts the BOK’s efforts to contain rising prices. By not raising interest rates and trying to hold its currency down, it risks stoking inflation. What’s more – South Korea is actually hosting this week’s G20 summit, at which currency intervention is expected to be a major topic of discussion. It would be awkward, to say the least, if Korea’s own currency intervention was broached.
Thus, it seems the Korean Won is destined to keep rising. It, too, is well below its 2007 peak, and there is scope for further appreciation. The BOK will continue to make token attempts at halting its rise, but at this point, the forces that is fighting against – bullish investors and other Central Banks – are too great.